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Transnational	  health	  law	  beyond	  the	  private/public	  divide	  – the	  case	  of	  reproductive	  rights	  
	  
ATINA	  KRAJEWSKA*	  
This	   paper	   aims	   to	   revisit	   the	   debates	   concerning	   the	   nature	   and	   patterns	   of	  
development	  of	   transnational	   law	  and	  global	   constitutionalism	  and	   it	  utilises	   the	  
example	  of	  the	  rapidly	  growing	  field	  of	  transnational	  health	  law	  as	  a	  case	  study.	  It	  
first	   highlights	   an	   important	   friction	   between	   two	   opposing	   theories	   of	  
transnational	   law,	   which	   view	   the	   latter	   as	   either	   a	   predominantly	   private	   or	   a	  
predominantly	   public	   construction.	   It	   then	   argues	   that	   these	   two	   views	   need	   not	  
necessarily	  be	  seen	  as	  exclusive	  and	  diametrically	  opposed,	  but	  as	  two	  distinct,	  yet	  
interrelated,	  aspects	  of	  the	  same	  process	  in	  which	  legal	  subjectivity	  is	  established	  in	  
transnational	   law.	   The	   paper	   takes	   as	   a	   case	   study	   the	   emergence	   of	   legal	  
subjectivity	   in	   the	   area	   of	   transnational	   law	   regulating	   assisted	   reproduction	  
technologies,	  and	  it	  maps	  the	  two	  different	  conceptions	  of	  transnational	   law	  onto	  
different	  stages	  in	  the	  process	  in	  which	  new	  subjects	  become	  legally	  visible.	  As	  such,	  
the	  paper	  contributes	  to	  wider	  discussions	  concerning	  the	  nature	  of	  transnational	  
law,	  transnational	  health	  law,	  and	  legal	  subjectivity.	  
	  
INTRODUCTION	  This	   paper	   aims	   to	   revisit	   the	   debates	   concerning	   the	   nature	   and	   patterns	   of	  development	  of	  transnational	  law	  and	  global	  constitutionalism,	  and	  it	  utilises	  the	  example	  of	  the	  rapidly	  growing	  field	  of	  transnational	  health	  law	  (THL)	  as	  a	  case	  study.	   For	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	   study,	   THL	   is	   defined	   as	   a	   complex	   set	   of	   laws	  combining	   international	   law	  as	  well	   as	  domestic	  public	   and	  private	   law	  norms	  affecting	   cross-­‐border	  health	   issues,	  determinants,	   and	   solutions.	  This	  working	  definition	   draws	   on	   the	   early	   conceptions	   of	   transnational	   law,	   according	   to	  which	   transnational	   law	   is	   a	   body	   of	   law	   that	   encompasses	   ‘all	   law	   which	  regulates	   actions	   or	   events	   that	   transcend	   national	   frontiers’,	   including	   public	  and	  private	  international	  law	  and	  ‘other	  rules,	  which	  do	  not	  wholly	  fit	  into	  such	  standard	   categories.’1	  Despite	   decades	   of	   academic	   discussion,	   questions	   about	  the	   nature,	   role,	   and	   development	   of	   transnational	   law	   are	   far	   from	   settled.	  Scholars	  continue	  to	  disagree	  about	  the	  effects	  of	  globalisation	  on	  domestic	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *Dr	  Atina	  Krajewska,	  Senior	  Birmingham	  Fellow,	  Birmingham	  Law	  School,	  University	  of	  
Birmingham,	  Email:	  a.krajewska.1@bham.ac.uk.	  I	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  Jiri	  Priban	  and	  Chris	  Thornhill	  for	  taking	  the	  time	  to	  read	  an	  earlier	  version	  of	  this	  paper	  and	  for	  their	  insightful	  comments	  and	  suggestions.	  The	  paper	  is	  one	  of	  the	  outcomes	  of	  the	  BA	  Small	  Research	  Grant	  No.	  SG153094	  ‘Single	  persons	  in	  publicly	  funded	  fertility	  treatment	  in	  the	  UK	  -­‐	  should	  we	  care?’,	  http://www.britac.ac.uk/small-­‐research-­‐grants-­‐past-­‐awards-­‐2015-­‐16.	  	  1	  P.	  Jessup,	  Transnational	  Law	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1956),	  1-­‐8.	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international	   law,	   and	   the	   degree	   of	   pluralisation 2 ,	   fragmentation 3 ,	   or	  privatisation4	  pervading	   the	   legal	   system	   at	   different	   levels	   of	   law	   formation.	  They	  grapple	  with	  the	  need	  to	  conceptualise	  a	   legal	  system	  that	  contains	  many	  sources	   of	   obligation,	   in	   which	   a	   convincing	   rule	   of	   recognition	   has	   not	   been	  formulated,	  the	  institutions	  for	  adjudication	  are	  often	  non-­‐judicial,	  and	  processes	  of	  change	  are	  not	  easily	  articulated	  in	  terms	  of	  legal	  rules.5	  Consequently,	  much	  of	   transnational	   law	   theory	   consists	   of	   various	   attempts	   to	   bring	   order	   and	  coherence	  into	  the	  international	  arena.	  These	  attempts	  often	  revolve	  around	  the	  notion	   of	   global	   constitutionalism 6 ,	   which	   focuses	   on	   the	   emergence	   of	  constitutional	  principles	  and	  structures	  within	  the	  global	  context.7	  Inevitably,	  the	  analysis	   of	   these	   processes	   varies	   considerably	   and	   has	   generated	   many	  controversies.	  	  	  An	   important	   tension	   exists	   between	   theorists	   who	   claim	   that	   the	  constitutionalisation	  of	  transnational	  law	  is	  to	  be	  found	  mainly	  within	  the	  realm	  of	   private	   law,	   in	   private	   orderings	   increasingly	   autonomous	   vis-­‐a-­‐vis	   state	  structures,	   and	   theorists	   who	   contest	   these	   claims,	   arguing	   that	   transnational	  law	   is	   in	   fact	   predominantly	   public,	   in	   that	   public	   authorities	   –	   and	   courts	   in	  particular	   –	   play	   a	   vital	   role	   in	   its	   constitutional	   formation.	   This	   distinction	   is	  highly	   significant,	   not	   only	   because	   it	   represents	   two	   diametrically	   opposed	  views	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   transnational	   law,	   but	   because	   it	   reflects	   two	   different	  conceptions	   of	   the	   role	   of	   the	   law	   in	   shaping	   political,	   social	   and	   economic	  processes.	   It	   can	   also	   have	   important	   practical	   consequences	   as	   it	   can	   help	   us	  react	   to	   the	   problems	   occurring	   in	   connection	  with	   globalisation.	   If	  we	   accept	  that	   one	   of	   the	   implications	   of	   globalisation	   is	   a	   diminution	   the	   power	   of	   the	  state,	  we	  might	  want	  to	  focus	  our	  scholarly	  attention	  and	  policy	  efforts	  on	  non-­‐state	   actors,	   e.g.	   NGOs,	   private	   companies,	   and	   professional	   associations.	   If,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  N.	  Krisch,	  Beyond	  Constitutionalism.	  The	  Pluralist	  Structure	  of	  Postnational	  Law	  (Oxford:	  OUP	  2010);	  W.	  Twining,	  Globalisation	  and	  Legal	  Theory	  (London:	  Butterworths,	  2000),	  B.	  de	  Sousa	  Santos,	  Towards	  a	  New	  Legal	  Common	  Sense	  (London:	  Butterworths,	  2002),	  R.	  Michaels,	  ‘Global	  Legal	  Pluralism’	  (2009)	  5	  Annual	  Review	  of	  Law	  and	  Social	  Sciences,	  243-­‐262.	  3	  M.	  Koskenniemi,	  ‘The	  Fate	  of	  Public	  International	  Law:	  Between	  Technique	  and	  Politics’,	  (2007)	  70	  Modern	  Law	  Review,	  1-­‐30;	  M.	  Koskenniemi,	  P.	  Leino,	  ‘Fragmentation	  of	  International	  Law?	  Postmodern	  Anxieties’,	  (2002)	  15	  Leiden	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  3,	  553-­‐579.	  4	  A-­‐M.Slaughter,	  A	  New	  World	  Order,	  Princeton,	  (New	  York:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2004);	  S.	  Tully,	  Corporations	  and	  International	  Lawmaking	  (Boston	  Leiden:	  Martin	  Nijhoff,	  2007).	  5	  B.	  Kingsbury,	  ‘The	  Concept	  of	  ‘Law’	  in	  Global	  Administrative	  Law’	  (2009)	  20	  The	  European	  
Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  1,	  23-­‐57,	  29.	  6	  For	  instance	  to	  name	  a	  few:	  M.	  Loughlin,	  N.	  Walker,	  The	  Paradox	  of	  Constitutionalism:	  
Constituent	  Power	  and	  Constitutional	  Form	  (Oxford:	  OUP	  2007);	  J.	  Klabbers,	  A.	  Peters,	  G.	  Ulfstein	  (eds.),	  The	  Constitutionalization	  of	  International	  Law	  (Oxford:	  OUP	  2009),	  N.	  Krisch,	  Beyond	  
Constitutionalism.	  The	  Pluralist	  Structure	  of	  Postnational	  Law	  (Oxford:	  OUP	  2010);	  C.	  Thornhill,	  A	  
Sociology	  of	  Transnational	  Constitutions:	  Social	  Foundations	  of	  the	  Post-­‐	  National	  Legal	  Structure	  (Cambridge	  Studies	  in	  Law	  and	  Society	  2016),	  7	  N.	  Walker,	  'Flexibility	  within	  a	  Metaconstitutional	  Frame:	  Reflections	  on	  the	  Future	  of	  Legal	  Authority	  in	  Europe'	  in	  G.	  de	  Burca	  and	  Scott,	  Constitutional	  Change	  in	  the	  EU:	  Between	  Uniformity	  
and	  Flexibility	  (Oxford:	  Hart,	  2000),	  9;	  N.	  Walker,	  ‘The	  Idea	  of	  Constitutional	  Pluralism’	  (2002)	  65	  
Modern	  Law	  Review,	  317-­‐359.	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however,	  we	  discover	  that	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  or	  the	  judiciary	  is	  increasing,	  our	  attention	   might	   shift	   towards	   solutions	   involving	   government	   institutions,	  administrative	  bodies,	  and	  international	  or	  domestic	  courts.	  Taking	  this	  tension	  as	  a	  starting	  point,	  this	  paper	  has	  two	  main	  aims.	  	  First,	   the	   paper	   argues	   that	   the	   two	   visions	   of	   transnational	   law	   need	   not	  necessarily	  be	  seen	  as	  exclusive	  and	  diametrically	  opposed.	  Instead,	  it	  proposes	  that	   we	   consider	   them	   as	   two	   distinct,	   yet	   interrelated,	   aspects	   of	   the	   same	  process:	   a	   process	   namely,	   in	   which	   legal	   subjectivity	   is	   established	   in	  transnational	   law.	   Consequently,	   the	   analysis	   is	   centred	   around	   the	   concept	   of	  invisible	  subjects	  and	  the	  process	  of	  visibilisation,	  which	  it	  addresses	  as	  a	  means	  to	   reconcile	   the	   two	   dominant	   views	   concerning	   transnational	   law	   formation.	  The	   two	   different	   conceptions	   of	   transnational	   law	   are	  mapped	   onto	   different	  stages	  of	  visibilisation	  through	  law.	  In	  order	  to	  achieve	  this	  aim	  the	  paper	  takes	  as	  a	   case	   study	   the	  emergence	  of	   legal	   subjectivity	   in	   the	  area	  of	   transnational	  law	   regulating	   assisted	   reproduction	   technologies	   (ARTs).	   More	   specifically,	   it	  focuses	  on	  the	  recent	  jurisprudential	  and	  legislative	  developments	  in	  the	  UK	  that	  led	   to	   the	  appearance	  of	  a	  new,	  hitherto	   largely	   invisible,	  group	  of	  subjects,	   i.e.	  
single	  persons	  who	  become	  parents	   using	  ARTs	   (in	   particular,	   surrogacy).8	  The	  long	  and	  complex	  journey	  of	  single	  persons	  to	  legal	  parenthood	  is	  mapped	  onto	  the	   divide	   between	   the	   private	   and	   public	   conceptions	   of	   transnational	   law.	  While	   the	   historical	   invisibility	   of	   single	   persons	   in	   fertility	   treatment	   is	  associated	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  transnational	  ART	  services	  are	  mainly	  governed	  by	  private	   law,	   the	   establishment	   of	   legal	   subjectivity,	   which	   in	   this	   case	   has	  occurred	   through	   human	   rights	   litigation,	   is	   seen	   as	   belonging	   to	   the	   realm	   of	  public	  law.	  Consequently,	  the	  process	  of	  visibilisation	  serves	  as	  an	  axis,	  on	  which	  the	  two	  conceptions	  of	  transnational	  law	  can	  be	  reconciled.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  paper	  claims	  that	  visibilisation	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  linear,	  but	  rather	  as	  part	  of	  a	  multiple,	   recursive	  process,	   punctuated	  by	   iterations	  of	   norm	  making	   among	  transnational	   actors,	   cycles	   of	   lawmaking	   in	   nation-­‐states,	   and	   patterns	   of	  engagement	  between	  them.9	  As	  such,	  the	  paper	  contributes	  to	  wider	  discussions	  concerning	   the	   nature	   of	   transnational	   law	   and	   the	   way	   in	   which	   legal	  subjectivity	   is	   affected	   by	   the	   centrifugal	   and	   multilevel	   processes	   of	  globalisation.10	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  T.	  Jarrett,	  Briefing	  Paper:	  Children:	  surrogacy,	  and	  single	  people	  and	  parental	  orders	  (UK),	  Number	  8076,	  5	  February	  2018,	  available	  at:	  http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-­‐8076.	  The	  choice	  of	  this	  case	  study	  is	  not	  accidental.	  It	  is	  chosen	  because	  of	  its	  explanatory	  value,	  as	  it	  brings	  into	  sharp	  focus	  broader	  problems	  emerging	  in	  the	  field	  of	  transnational	  health	  law	  in	  the	  context	  of	  assisted	  reproduction,	  including	  in	  vitro	  fertilization	  and	  surrogacy.	  9	  T.	  C.	  Halliday,	  ‘Recursivity	  of	  Global	  Normmaking:	  A	  Sociolegal	  Agenda’	  (2009)	  5	  Annual	  Review	  
of	  Law	  and	  Social	  Science,	  263–89.	  10	  A.	  Peters,	  Beyond	  Human	  Rights:	  The	  Legal	  Status	  of	  the	  Individual	  in	  International	  Law,	  (Cambridge:	  CUP	  2016);	  C.	  Menke,	  ‘The	  Self-­‐Reflection	  of	  Law	  and	  Politics’,	  (2011)	  18	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Second,	   the	  paper	  contributes	   to	   theoretical	  debates	  about	  transnational	  health	  
law	  (THL)	  by	  demonstrating	  that	  THL	  escapes	  straightforward	  categorisations	  as	  a	  system	  of	  either	  private	  or	  public	   law.	  It	  shows	  that	  THL	  could	  potentially	  be	  examined	   in	  a	  perspective	   that	  offers	  support	   for	  either	  vision	  of	   transnational	  law.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   it	   could	   be	   said	   to	   display	   strong	   tendencies	   of	  ‘privatisation’,	  in	  that	  cross-­‐border	  healthcare	  may	  be	  delivered	  and	  managed	  by	  private	  actors	  and	  regulated	  by	  professional	   codes.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   the	   fact	  that	   health	   rights	   have	   recently	   undergone	   a	   process	   of	   unprecedented	  judicialisation	  indicates	  the	  ever-­‐growing	  presence	  of	  the	  state	  in	  the	  delivery	  of	  increasingly	   globalised	   health	   care.	   This	   analysis	   is	   particularly	   important,	  because	   while	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   ‘medical’11 	  or	   ‘reproductive	   tourism’12 	  –	  perhaps	  more	   aptly	   called	   ‘medical	  migration’13,	   or	   ‘reproductive	   exile’14	  –	   has	  drawn	  considerable	  media15	  and	  academic16	  attention,	  theoretical	  constructions	  of	   transnational	   health	   law	   remain	   relatively	   limited17.	   This	   is	   far	   from	   ideal,	  especially	   since	   sexual	   and	   reproductive	   rights,	   understood	   as	   rights	   enabling	  individuals	   to	  participate	   fully	   in	   the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  concerning	   their	  sexual	  and	  reproductive	  health	  and	  well-­‐being18,	  constitute	  an	  important	  global	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Constellations	  2,	  124–34;	  A.	  Fischer-­‐Lescano,	  ‘Subjektlose	  Rechte’	  (2017)	  50	  Kritische	  Justiz	  4,	  475-­‐496.	  	  11	  G.	  Pennings,	  ‘Reproductive	  Tourism	  as	  Moral	  Pluralism	  in	  Motion’	  (2002)	  28	  Journal	  of	  Medical	  
Ethics	  6,	  337-­‐341;	  M.D.	  Horowitz,	  J.A.	  Rosensweig,	  Ch	  A.	  Jones	  ‘Medical	  Tourism:	  Globalization	  of	  the	  Healthcare	  Marketplace’	  (2007)	  9	  MedGenMed	  4,	  33.	  12	  G.	  Pennings,	  ‘Legal	  harmonization	  and	  reproductive	  tourism	  in	  Europe’	  (2004)	  19	  Human	  
Reproduction,	  2689–2694.	  13	  C.	  Thompson,	  ‘Medical	  migrations	  afterword:	  Science	  as	  a	  vacation?’	  (2011)	  17	  Body	  &	  Society,	  205-­‐13.	  14	  R.	  Matorras	  ‘Reproductive	  exile	  versus	  reproductive	  tourism’	  (2005)	  20	  Human	  
Reproduction	  12,	  3571–2;	  M.C.	  Inhorn,	  et	  al.,	  ‘Rethinking	  reproductive	  “tourism”	  as	  reproductive	  “exile”’	  (2009)	  92	  Fertility	  and	  Sterility	  3,	  904	  –	  906.	  15	  H.	  Sheffield,	  ‘Medigo:	  the	  Berlin-­‐based	  startup	  sending	  patients	  abroad	  for	  surgery’,	  The	  
Independent,	  27	  October	  2017;	  M.	  Brignall,	  ‘Poland's	  medical	  tourism	  clinics	  offer	  half-­‐price	  treatment	  to	  the	  world’,	  The	  Guardian,	  1	  June	  2014;	  R.	  Ramesh	  ,	  ‘This	  UK	  patient	  avoided	  the	  NHS	  list	  and	  flew	  to	  India	  for	  a	  heart	  bypass.	  Is	  health	  tourism	  the	  future?’,	  The	  Guardian,	  1	  February	  2005;	  BBC	  News,	  ‘Despair	  over	  ban	  in	  India's	  surrogacy	  hub’,	  22	  November	  2015;	  IMTJ	  News,	  ‘India	  introduces	  legislation	  to	  ban	  surrogacy	  tourism’,	  International	  Medical	  Tourism	  Journal,	  7	  December	  2015,	  available	  at:	  https://www.imtj.com/news/india-­‐introduces-­‐legislation-­‐ban-­‐surrogacy-­‐tourism/	  .	  	  16	  M.	  R.	  Nahman,	  ‘Reproductive	  Tourism:	  Through	  the	  Anthropological	  “Reproscope”’,	  (2016)	  45	  
Annual	  Review	  of	  Anthropology,	  417–32;	  M.	  C.	  Inhorn	  and	  P.	  Patrizio,	  ’Infertility	  around	  the	  globe:	  new	  thinking	  on	  gender,	  reproductive	  technologies	  and	  global	  movements	  in	  the	  21st	  century’	  (2015)	  21	  Human	  Reproduction	  Update	  4,	  411–426;	  N.	  Hudson	  et	  al.,	  ‘Cross-­‐border	  reproductive	  care:	  a	  review	  of	  the	  literature’,	  (2011)	  22	  Reproductive	  Biomedicine	  Online	  7,	  673-­‐85.	  17	  J.	  Harrington,	  ‘Migration	  and	  access	  to	  health	  care	  in	  English	  medical	  law:	  a	  rhetorical	  critique’,	  (2009)	  4	  International	  Journal	  of	  Law	  in	  Context	  4,	  315-­‐335;	  R.	  Fletcher,	  ‘Peripheral	  governance:	  administering	  transnational	  health-­‐care	  flows’,	  (2013)	  9	  International	  Journal	  of	  Law	  in	  Context	  2,	  160-­‐191;	  I.	  Glenn	  Cohen,	  Patients	  with	  Passports:	  Medical	  Tourism,	  Law	  and	  Ethics,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  2015);	  Botterill,	  D.,	  Pennings,	  G.	  and	  Mainil,	  T.	  (eds).	  Medical	  Tourism	  
and	  Transnational	  Health	  Care	  (Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan	  2013).	  18	  R.	  Cook,	  B.	  Dickens,	  M.	  Fathalla,	  Reproductive	  Health	  and	  Human	  Rights:	  Integrating	  Medicine,	  
Ethics,	  and	  Law,	  (Oxford	  University	  Press	  2003),	  12.	  More	  specifically,	  reproductive	  rights	  have	  been	  defined	  as	  resting	  on	  ‘the	  recognition	  of	  the	  basic	  right	  of	  all	  couples	  and	  individuals	  to	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challenge.19	  The	   analysis	   of	   the	   process	   in	   which	   invisible	   subjects	   become	  visibilised	   can	   offer	   a	   useful	   and	   more	   progressive	   vision	   of	   the	   otherwise	  complex	   and	   meandering	   developments	   of	   transnational	   health	   law,	   and	  transnational	  reproductive	  health	  law	  in	  particular20.	  	  
	  
THEORETICAL	  FRAMEWORK	  The	   theory	   of	   transnational	   law	   is	   a	   dynamic	   and	   rapidly	   changing	   field	  concerned	  with	  the	  status	  and	  the	  role	  of	  law	  in	  an	  increasingly	  globalised	  web	  of	   regulatory	   regimes,	   actors,	   norms,	   and	   processes.	   As	   a	   field	   of	   inquiry	  ‘transnational	  law	  emerges	  as	  a	  series	  of	  contemplations	  about	  the	  form	  of	  legal	  regulation	   with	   regard	   to	   border-­‐crossing	   transactions	   and	   fact	   patterns	  transgressing	   jurisdictional	   boundaries	   that	   involve	   public	   and	   private	   actors	  and	   norms.’21	  Consequently,	   transnational	   law	   has	   been	   seen	   as	   a	   sui	   generis	  legal	   domain,	   developing	   autonomously	   in	   relation	   to	   both	   national	   and	  international	   constitutional	   norms. 22 	  The	   debates	   about	   the	   nature	   of	  transnational	   law	   have	   been	   closely	   connected	   to	   the	  widespread	   attempts,	   to	  transpose	  constitutionalism	  onto	  the	  global	  arena.23	  Within	  this	  framework,	  two	  important	  theoretical	  approaches	  have	  emerged	  in	  recent	  years.	  	  	  
1. The	  expansion	  of	  global	  private	  orderings	  	  One	   important	   body	   of	   literature	   concerning	   transnational	   law	   accentuates	  global	   institutional	   and	   normative	   pluralism	   and	   the	   distinctive	   horizontal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  decide	  freely	  and	  responsibly	  the	  number,	  spacing	  and	  timing	  of	  their	  children	  and	  to	  have	  the	  information	  and	  means	  to	  do	  so,	  and	  the	  right	  to	  attain	  the	  highest	  standard	  of	  sexual	  and	  reproductive	  health.	  They	  also	  include	  the	  right	  of	  all	  to	  make	  decisions	  concerning	  reproduction	  free	  of	  discrimination,	  coercion	  and	  violence’.	  See:	  Programme	  of	  action	  of	  the	  International	  
Conference	  on	  Population	  and	  Development,	  Cairo,	  1994.	  New	  York:	  United	  Nations;	  1995:	  paragraph	  7.2-­‐7.3.	  19	  UN	  Committee	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights,	  General	  Comment	  No.	  22:	  The	  Right	  to	  
sexual	  and	  reproductive	  health	  (article	  12	  of	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  
Cultural	  Rights),	  UN	  Doc.	  E/C.12/GC/22,	  4	  March	  2016.	  See	  also:	  Goal	  3	  and	  Goal	  5	  in	  the	  Sustainable	  Development	  Agenda	  2030,	  available	  at:	  https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld	  	  	  	  20	  The	  terms	  transnational	  reproductive	  health	  law	  is	  used	  to	  describe	  a	  subsystem	  of	  transnational	  health	  law	  that	  regulates	  sexual	  and	  reproductive	  health.	  21	  P.	  Zumbansen,	  ‘Transnational	  Law,	  Evolving’	  (2011).	  Comparative	  Research	  in	  Law	  &	  Political	  
Economy.	  Research	  Paper	  No.	  27/	  2011,	  available	  at:	  http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/clpe/65	  	  	  22	  C.	  Scott,	  ‘‘’Transnational	  Law”	  as	  Proto-­‐concept:	  Three	  conceptions’	  (2009)	  10	  German	  Law	  
Journal	  7,	  859,	  873–4.	  	  23	  D.	  Grimm,	  Verfassung.	  Zur	  Geschichte	  des	  Begriffs	  von	  der	  Antike	  bis	  zur	  Gegenwart	  (Duncker	  &	  Humblot	  GmbH,	  1995);	  A.	  Peters,	  Elemente	  einer	  Theorie	  der	  Verfassung	  Europas	  (Duncker	  &	  Humblot,	  2001),	  38–92.	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character	   of	   the	   contemporary	   constitutional	   system.24	  What	   follows	   from	   this	  premise	   is	   the	   claim	   that	   the	   multiple	   cross-­‐border	   and	   inter-­‐functional	  exchanges	   in	   global	   society	   create	   and	   necessitate	   an	   increasingly	   flexible,	  inherently	  pluralistic,	   and	  multi-­‐centered	   system	  of	   legal	  norm	  production	  and	  enforcement.	  Importantly,	  this	  account	  of	  institutional	  and	  normative	  pluralism	  necessarily	   accepts	   the	   diminishing	   role	   of	   the	   state	   in	   international	   law	   and	  society.	   The	   state	   becomes	   one	   among	   many	   law-­‐producing	   loci	   of	   authority.	  Furthermore,	   theories	   of	   constitutional	   pluralism	   claim	   that	   global	   society	   is	  marked	   by	   ‘the	   incommensurability	   of	   authority	   claims	   -­‐	   in	   particular	   of	   the	  discrete	   claims	   to	   final	   authority	   over	   the	   interpretation	   and	   extent	   of	  jurisdiction	   of	   the	   various	   political	   units.’25	  Some	   of	   these	   conceptualisations	  have	   led	   to	   observations	   that	   private	   law	   has	   begun	   to	   extend	   beyond	   its	  conventional	  boundaries	  and	  is	  now	  able	  to	  perform	  some	  of	  the	  classical	  public	  law	  (state)	  functions	  in	  setting	  out	  the	  normative	  and	  institutional	  structures	  for	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  global	  society.26	  	  In	   this	   respect,	   one	   of	   the	   most	   salient	   constitutional	   theories	   in	   research	   on	  transnational	   law	   has	   been	   set	   out	   by	   Gunther	   Teubner,	   who	   developed	   the	  concept	  of	  global	  societal	  constitutionalism,	  which	  describes	  a	  process	  in	  which	  ‘private	   actors	   not	   only	   participate	   in	   the	   political	   power	   processes	   of	   global	  governance,	   but	   also	   establish	   their	   own	   regimes	   outside	   of	   institutionalized	  politics.’27	  According	   to	   Teubner,	   when	   functional	   spheres,	   such	   as	   economy,	  science,	   or	   medicine	   become	   global,	   the	   power	   of	   the	   state	   to	   set	   limits	   and	  navigate	  their	  outward	  expansive	  tendencies	  and	  regulate	  the	  conflicts	  between	  regimes	  disappears.	  As	  a	   result,	  where	   there	   is	  no	  political	  or	   legal	   framework	  facilitating	   internal	   and	   external	   communication,	   private	   orderings,	   including	  science	  and	  medicine,	  make	  universal	  claims	  and	  set	  global	  agendas	  transversing	  national	   borders.	  28	  	   Such	   global	   expansion	   of	   functional	   spheres	   can	   lead	   to	  ‘inward	  explosion’,	  and	  it	  can	  trigger	  different	  crises	  that	  threaten	  the	  existence	  of	   the	  particular	   system.	   It	   is	   at	   that	  moment	   that	   the	  pressure	   for	   global	   self-­‐foundation	   (and	   autonomisation)	   increases	   and	   reveals	   its	   ‘jurisgenerative	  potential’,	  and	  it	  is	  then	  that	  subsystems	  of	  world	  society	  begin	  to	  develop	  their	  own	   constitutional	   legal	   norms.29	  According	   to	   Teubner,	   who	   in	   this	   respect	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  N.	  Krisch,	  Beyond	  Constitutionalism.	  The	  Pluralist	  Structure	  of	  Postnational	  Law	  (Oxford:	  OUP	  2010);	  W.	  Twining,	  Globalisation	  and	  Legal	  Theory	  (London:	  Butterworths,	  2000),	  B.	  de	  Sousa	  Santos,	  Towards	  a	  New	  Legal	  Common	  Sense	  (London:	  Butterworths,	  2002);	  P.	  Zumbansen,	  ‘Transnational	  Legal	  Pluralism’,	  (2010)	  1	  Transnational	  Legal	  Theory	  2,	  141-­‐189.	  25	  	  N.	  Walker,	  ‘The	  Idea	  of	  Constitutional	  Pluralism’,	  (2002)	  65	  Modern	  Law	  Review,	  317-­‐359,	  338.	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  pluralist	  theories:	  R.	  Michaels,	  ‘Global	  Legal	  Pluralism’,	  (2009)	  5	  Annual	  
Review	  of	  Law	  and	  Social	  Science,	  243-­‐262.	  	  26	  G-­‐P.	  Calliess	  and	  P.	  Zumbansen,	  Rough	  Consensus	  and	  Running	  Code:	  A	  Theory	  of	  Transnational	  
Private	  Law	  (Oxford:	  Hart	  Publishing,	  2010)	  75,	  166–8,	  243.	  27	  G.	  Teubner,	  Constitutional	  Fragments.	  Societal	  Constitutionalism	  and	  Globalisation,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2012),	  9.	  28	  Ibid	  43-­‐44.	  29	  Ibid	  59.	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follows	   Luhmann,	   full	   self-­‐constitutionalisation	   is	   impossible	   without	   legal	  norms	  enabling	  and	  supporting	   the	   realisation	  of	   system’s	   full	   autonomy.30	  For	  this	  reason,	  this	  theory	  accords	  great	  importance	  to	  basic	  (fundamental)	  rights.	  Although	   the	   historical	   role	   of	   basic	   rights	   has	   been	   to	   protect	   the	   precarious	  results	  of	  social	  differentiation	  from	  their	  politicisation,	  in	  contemporary	  global	  society	   fundamental	   rights	   are	   directed	   not	   only	   against	   the	   state	   action,	   but	  against	   the	   intrusions	   of	   other	   expansive	   social	   systems,	   such	   as	   economy,	  medicine,	   science.	   Rights	   are	   the	   social	   counter-­‐institutions	   that	   exist	   inside	  individual	   sub-­‐systems	   and	   restrict	   their	   expansion	   from	   within.	   As	   aptly	  observed	  by	  Verschraegen	  ’[a]nalogous	  to	  the	  fundamental	  rights	  in	  the	  context	  of	   the	  nation-­‐state,	   these	   fundamental	   rights	  are	   Janus-­‐faced.	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	  they	  have	  to	  enable	  autonomisation	  of	  each	  functional	  system,	  enabling	  free	  and	  equal	  access	  for	  everybody.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  they	  have	  set	  the	  boundaries	  for	  the	  totalising	  tendencies	  of	  autonomised	  communicative	  media.’31	  Therefore,	  an	  important	  feature	  of	  this	  vision	  of	  transnational	  law	  is	  that	  law,	  and	  basic	  rights	  in	  particular,	  are	  developed	  mainly	  as	  a	  part	  of	  private	  normative	  sphere.	  	  
2. Transnational	  law	  as	  a	  predominantly	  public	  law	  construction	  	  Alternative	   theories,	  developed	   in	  parallel	   to	  Teubner’s	  conceptualisation,	  view	  transnational	   law	   and	   global	   constitutionalism	   as	   a	   predominantly	   public	   law	  construction,	  albeit	  not	  without	   its	   complexities.	  Within	   this	  body	  of	   literature,	  there	   are	   many	   variations.	   There	   are	   those	   who	   argue	   that	   the	   nascent	  constitution	  of	  global	  society	  is	  derived	  directly	  from	  international	  human	  rights	  law,	  imposing	  universal	  constitutional	  constraints	  on	  legislation	  at	  national	  and	  supranational	   levels.32	  Consequently,	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   litigation	   based	   on	  human	   rights	   claims	   acquires	   particular	   importance.	   The	   human	   rights	   norms	  governing	  these	  claims	  are	  of	  such	  border-­‐crossing	  nature	  that	  they	  increasingly	  both	   undercut	   and	   surpass	   the	   territorial	   boundaries	   upon	   which	   various	  jurisdictional	  competencies	  have	  been	  predicated.33	  Therefore,	  according	  to	  this	  view,	   transnational	   law	   largely	  overlaps	  with	   the	  expanding	  human	   rights	   law.	  Another	  body	  of	   literature	   focuses	  on	   the	  role	  of	  administrative	   law	   in	  shaping	  the	  transnational	  exchanges	  of	  global	  society	  and	  it	  addresses	  the	  convergence	  of	  administrative	   law-­‐type	   principles	   and	   practices	   between	   otherwise	   disparate	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  ibid	  107.	  31	  G.	  Verschraegen,	  ‘Differentiation	  and	  Inclusion:	  A	  Neglected	  Sociological	  Approach	  to	  Fundamental	  Rights’,	  in:	  M.R.	  Madsen	  and	  G.	  Verschraegen,	  Making	  Human	  Rights	  Intelligible:	  
Towards	  a	  Sociology	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  (Oxford:	  Hart	  Publishing	  2013),	  61-­‐80.	  32	  S.	  Fredman,	  Human	  Rights	  Transformed:	  Positive	  Rights	  and	  Positive	  Duties	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008);	  D.Friedman	  and	  D.	  Barak-­‐Erez	  (eds),	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Private	  Law	  (Oxford:	  Hart	  Publishing,	  2001).	  33	  P.	  Zumbansen,	  ‘Transnational	  Law,	  Evolving’	  (2011).	  Comparative	  Research	  in	  Law	  &	  Political	  
Economy.	  Research	  Paper	  No.	  27/	  2011,	  available	  at:	  http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/clpe/65	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areas	  of	  governance.34	  This	  vision	  of	  law	  ascribes	  legal	  status	  to	  a	  great	  number	  of	  different	  forms,	  ranging	  from	  binding	  decisions	  of	  international	  organizations	  to	   non-­‐binding	   agreements	   in	   intergovernmental	   networks	   and	   to	   domestic	  administrative	  action	   in	  the	  context	  of	  global	  regimes.35	  Nevertheless,	   legal	  and	  non-­‐legal	   norms	   can	   be	   distinguished.	   According	   to	   Kingsbury,	   the	   main	  proponent	   of	   this	   approach,	   even	   in	   the	   normatively	   highly	   fragmented	   and	  heterarchical	   global	   world,	   the	   distinction	   between	   law	   and	   non-­‐law	   relies	   on	  constructions	  of	  ‘publicness’,	  i.e.	  ‘the	  claim	  made	  for	  law	  that	  it	  has	  been	  wrought	  by	  the	  whole	  society,	  by	  the	  public,	  and	  the	  connected	  claim	  that	  law	  addresses	  matters	  of	  concern	  to	  the	  society	  as	  such.’36	  Finally,	  the	  theory,	  which	  has	  gained	  prominence	   as	   an	   alternative	   to	   Teubner’s	   idea	   of	   societal	   fragments,	   while	  sharing	   the	   same	   systems-­‐theoretical	   basis,	   is	   the	   theory	   of	   transnational	  constitutions	  developed	  in	  recent	  years	  by	  Chris	  Thornhill.37	  	  The	   central	   argument	   put	   forward	   by	   Thornhill	   is	   that	   transnational	  constitutions	  are	  not	   in	  a	   relation	  of	  discontinuity	  vis-­‐a-­‐vis	  modern	  state-­‐based	  constitutions.	  Instead,	  he	  claims	  that	  transnational	  constitutionalism	  is	  a	  stage	  in	  the	  development	  of	  modern	  constitutionalism	  and	  it	  can	  better	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  new	  tool	  for	  consolidating	  nation	  states'	  power.	  Using	  a	  historical-­‐sociological	  approach,	  Thornhill	  proposes	  a	  conception	  of	  transnational	  constitutionalism	  in	  which	   the	   growth	   of	   global	   constitutional	   norms	   has	   provided	   a	   stabilizing	  framework	  for	  the	   functions	  of	  state	   institutions.	   Importantly,	   for	  Thornhill	   the	  idea	  of	  constitutional	  (universal)	  rights	  has	  been	  fundamental	   in	  the	  process	  of	  state	  formation,	  because	  they	  allowed	  states,	  i.e.	  the	  political	  system,	  ‘to	  explain	  itself	   as	   a	   legitimate	   actor	   and…	   peacefully	   integrate	   its	   citizens	   under	   laws	  obtaining	   recognition	   and	   compliance.’38	  In	   global	   society,	   this	   importance	   of	  rights	  as	  a	  function	  of	  inclusion	  for	  the	  nation-­‐state	  does	  not	  disappear,	  but	  it	  is	  reinforced	   at	   the	   global	   level.	   International	   human	   rights	   developed	   after	   the	  World	  War	  II,	  and	  incorporated	  into	  domestic	  law	  by	  national	  societies,	  are	  seen	  as	   normative	   institutions	   that	   strengthened	   the	   inclusionary	   structure	   of	   their	  political	   systems,	   and	   that	   ‘allowed	   these	   political	   systems	   to	   act	   at	   a	   level	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  B.	  Kingsbury,	  N.	  Krisch	  and	  Stewart,	  ‘The	  Emergence	  of	  Global	  Administrative	  Law’,	  (2005)	  68	  
Law	  &	  Contemporary	  Problems	  3,	  15.	  	  35	  B.	  Kingsbury,	  N.	  Krisch,	  ‘Global	  Governance	  and	  Global	  Administrative	  Law	  in	  the	  International	  Legal	  Order’	  (2006)	  17	  The	  European	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  1,	  1-­‐13,	  3.	  	  	  36	  B.	  Kingsbury,	  ‘The	  Concept	  of	  “Law”	  in	  Global	  Administrative	  Law’	  (2009)	  20	  The	  European	  
Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  1,	  24-­‐,	  31.	  37	  J.	  Priban,	  ‘Constitutionalism	  as	  Fear	  of	  the	  Political?	  A	  comparative	  analysis	  of	  Teubner’s	  Constitutional	  Fragments	  and	  Thornhill’s	  A	  Sociology	  of	  Constitutions’	  (2012)	  39	  Journal	  of	  Law	  
and	  Society	  3,	  441-­‐471.	  38	  C.	  Thornhill,	  ‘Towards	  a	  Historical	  Sociology	  of	  Constitutional	  Legitimacy’	  (2008)	  37	  Theory	  
and	  Society,	  161-­‐,	  174.	  See	  also:	  C.	  Thornhill,	  A	  Sociology	  of	  Constitutions:	  Constitutions	  and	  State	  
Legitimacy	  in	  Historical-­‐Sociological	  Perspective,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press	  2011).	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unprecedented	   autonomy,	   producing	   laws,	   reliably	   and	   inclusively,	   without	  constantly	  unsettling	  risk	  of	  annexation	  by	  private	  groups’.39	  	  According	   to	   Thornhill,	   in	   this	   respect,	   rights-­‐based	   litigation	   has	   clearly	  acquired	   a	   constituent	   role	   at	   the	   level	   of	   transnational	   norm	   construction.	  Furthermore,	  rights-­‐oriented	  litigation	  can	  create	  and	  generate	  norms	  of	  higher	  rank	   that	   are	   able	   to	   traverse	   previously	   separate	   jurisdictions.	   In	   these	  transnational	  settings,	   litigation	  has	  begun	  to	  produce	  ‘a	  defining	  constitutional	  grammar	   for	  society,	  and	  the	  regulatory	  structure	  of	  global	  society	   in	   its	  extra-­‐national	  dimensions	  is	  increasingly	  formed	  by	  subjects	  acting	  as	  litigants’.40	  This	  is	  possible,	  in	  part,	  because	  of	  the	  use	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality,	  through	  which	   principles	   of	   public	   law	   are	   imprinted	   on	   all	   social	   phenomena. 41	  Consequently,	   contemporary	   society	   is	   increasingly	   defined	  by	   the	   fact	   that	   its	  political	   system,	   both	   nationally	   and	   transnationally,	   constitutes	   itself	   directly	  through	   human	   rights,	   which	   are	   identified	   with	   single	   persons	   in	   society.	  ‘Transnational	  rights	  are	  thus	   in	  the	  process	  of	  becoming	  a	   fifth	  tier	  of	  rights	   in	  society’s	   inclusionary	   structure,	   and	   many	   acts	   of	   political	   inclusion	   are	   now	  based	   not	   in	   rights	   exercised	   by	   particular	   persons	   or	   groups	   of	   persons	   or	  populations	  but	  in	  rights	  constructed	  contingently,	  within	  the	  law.’42	  It	  is	  the	  idea	  of	   fundamental	   rights,	   inextricably	   linked	  with	   the	  concept	  of	   legal	   subjectivity	  that	  provides	  a	  useful	  basis	  for	  reconciliation	  between	  the	  two	  distinct	  theories	  of	  transnational	  law.	  	  
3. The	  process	  of	  acquiring	  legal	  subjectivity	  as	  an	  axis	  for	  reconciliation	  For	  Teubner,	   the	  main	   function	  of	   fundamental	   rights	   at	   the	  global	   level	   is	   the	  self-­‐limitation	  of	  private	  ordering	  and	  its	  protection	  from	  ‘inward	  explosion’	  and	  collapse.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   creation	   and	   integration	   of	   fundamental	   rights	  contribute	  to	  the	  autonomisation	  and	  self-­‐constitutionalisation	  of	  private	  orders.	  Fundamental	   rights	   created	  without	   recourse	   to	   the	  national	   level	  also	   ‘specify	  system-­‐specific	   conditions	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   a	   free	   and	   equal	   inclusion	   is	  permitted.’43	  Thornhill	   traces	   the	   inclusionary	   potential	   of	   fundamental	   rights,	  back	   to	   the	   national	   legal	   system,	  which	   -­‐	   (mainly)	   through	   courts	   and	   rights-­‐based	   litigation	   –	   integrates	   international	   human	   rights	   standards	   stabilising	  political	   power	   and	   transforming	   the	   domestic	   social	   structures.	   Nevertheless,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  C.	  Thornhill	  (2011),	  161.	  40	  C.	  Thornhill,	  A	  Sociology	  of	  Transnational	  Constitutions:	  Social	  Foundations	  of	  the	  Post-­‐	  National	  
Legal	  Structure	  (Cambridge	  Studies	  in	  Law	  and	  Society	  2016),	  393.	  41	  Ibidem,	  404.	  42	  Ibidem,	  418.	  43	  G.	  Verschraegen,	  ‘Differentiation	  and	  Inclusion:	  A	  Neglected	  Sociological	  Approach	  to	  Fundamental	  Rights’,	  in:	  M.R.	  Madsen	  and	  G.	  Verschraegen,	  Making	  Human	  Rights	  Intelligible:	  
Towards	  a	  Sociology	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  (Oxford:	  Hart	  Publishing	  2013),	  61-­‐80,	  77.	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following	  Durkheim	  and	  Luhmann,	  they	  both	  view	  rights	  as	  a	  social	  institution.44	  Both	   view	   rights	   (subjective,	   fundamental,	   human	   rights)	   as	   a	   vehicle	   of	  structural	  transformation	  and	  a	  vehicle	  for	  legal	  inclusion.	  	  It	   is	   argued	  here	   that	   it	   is	   the	   concept	  of	   inclusion	  –	   through	  visibilisation	  and	  legal	   subjectivisation	   –	   that	   holds	   the	   key	   to	   the	   reconciliation	   of	   these	   two	  theories.	   Visibilisation	   is	   understood	   as	   a	   process	   in	   which	   subjects	   who	  remained	   absent	   or	   excluded	   from	   the	   legal	   sphere	   acquire	   visibility	   through	  legal	  mechanisms	  as	  subjects	  of	  rights.	  This	  article	  shows	  how	  litigation	  can	  be	  constructed	  as	  a	  process,	  in	  which	  exclusion	  is	  made	  visible	  and	  subjects	  become	  legally	   relevant	   because	   of	   the	   acknowledgment	   of	   their	   particular	  entitlements.45	  In	   cases	  where	   litigation	   is	   successful,	   visibilisation	   can	  be	   seen	  as	   tantamount	   with	   the	   establishment	   of	   legal	   subjectivity.	   However,	   in	   cases	  where	   litigation	   is	   unsuccessful,	   the	   distinction	   between	   visibilisation	   and	  subjectivisation46	  will	  become	  relevant.	   In	  such	  cases,	  even	   if	   it	  does	  not	  create	  new	  rights,	   litigation	  helps	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  subjects	   in	  the	  context	  of	  particular	  legal	   expectations	   and	   entitlements.	   In	   such	   cases,	   as	   demonstrated	   below,	  litigation	  is	  often	  followed	  by	  the	  formal	  acquisition	  of	  legal	  subjectivity	  through	  other	   mechanisms,	   e.g.	   legislation.	   However,	   litigation	   will	   always	   inevitably	  construct	   litigants	   as	   subjects	   of	   rights	   and	   obligations.	   In	   this	   respect,	  visibilisation	   becomes	   a	   crucial	  moment	   in	   the	   process	   of	   subjectivisation	   and	  legal	   inclusion.	   The	   following	   analysis	   demonstrates	   that	   the	   two	   theories	   of	  transnational	  law	  form	  two	  separate	  yet	  interconnected	  dimensions	  of	  the	  same	  process	  i.e.	  the	  complex	  and	  recursive	  process	  of	  inclusion	  of	  new	  subjects	  into	  the	   realm	   of	   transnational	   law.	   In	   Teubner’s	   words,	   it	   is	   ‘a	   case	   of	   dialectic	  without	  synthesis’.	  47	  Both	  theories	  are	  necessarily	  dependent	  on	  each	  other.	  It	  is	  only	   the	  combination	  of	  both	  sides	  of	   the	  difference	   that	  brings	  out	   the	  special	  hybrid	  nature	  of	  THL.	  	  The	   argument	   follows	   the	   journey	  of	   single	  persons	   in	   fertility	   treatment	   from	  legal	   obscurity	   into	   legal	   light.	   It	   begins	   by	   analysing	   their	   exclusion	   from	   the	  legal	  framework,	  which	  led	  to	  their	  invisibility	  –	  that	  is,	  to	  their	  being	  placed	  in	  the	   state	   of	   interstitial	   legality.	   It	   subsequently	   examines	   the	   development	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  G.	  Verschraegen,	  ‘Systems	  Theory	  and	  the	  Paradox	  of	  Human	  Rights’,	  in:	  M.	  King	  and	  C.	  Thornhill	  (eds),	  Luhmann	  on	  Law	  and	  Politics:	  Critical	  Appraisal	  and	  Applications,	  (Oxford:	  Hart	  Publishing:	  2006,)	  101-­‐125.	  	  45	  In	  this	  respect	  the	  concept	  of	  visibilisation/invisibilisation	  used	  here	  differs	  from	  the	  notion	  of	  (in)visibilisation	  of	  the	  law’s	  paradox	  utilised	  by	  Luhmann	  in	  Die	  Gesellschaft	  der	  Gesellschaft	  (Frankfurt:	  Suhrkamp	  1997).	  	  46	  In	  this	  respect,	  the	  concept	  of	  subjectivisation	  differs	  from	  the	  term	  ‘assujettisment’,	  coined	  by	  Foucault.	  While	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  deny	  that	  empowerment	  is	  never	  the	  only	  purpose	  of	  any	  law	  or	  regulation,	  this	  focus	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  on	  the	  processes	  of	  visibilisation	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  legal	  subjectivity.	  See:	  M.	  Foucault,	  The	  Subject	  and	  Power,	  (1982)	  8	  Critical	  Inquiry	  4,	  777-­‐795;	  M.	  Foucault,	  The	  History	  of	  Sexuality.	  New	  York:	  Pantheon,	  1978.	  Reprinted	  as	  The	  Will	  to	  
Knowledge,	  (London:	  Penguin,	  1998).	  47	  G.	  Teubner,	  ‘In	  the	  blind	  spot:	  The	  Hybridization	  of	  Contracting’	  (2006)	  8	  Theoretical	  Inquiries	  
in	  Law,	  51-­‐71,	  61.	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transnational	  law	  regulating	  assisted	  reproduction	  in	  light	  of	  Teubner’s	  theory	  of	  societal	   constitutionalism.	   In	   this	   respect,	   it	  demonstrates	   the	  expansion	  of	   the	  system	  of	  transnational	  health	  law	  as	  a	  system	  of	  private	  law	  and	  identifies	  signs	  of	   its	   latent	   ‘constitutionalisation’.	   In	   the	   last	   part	   of	   the	   paper,	   the	   argument	  focuses	   on	   the	   process	   of	   visibilisation	   through	   human	   rights	   litigation.	   The	  analysis	   of	   the	   domestic	   and	   supranational	   litigation	   demonstrates	   the	  way	   in	  which	  public	  law	  assumes	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  development	  of	  transnational	  law.	   The	   analysis	   of	   the	   courts’	   arguments	   shows	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   human	  rights	  system	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  transnational	  health	  law.	  This	  leads	  to	  important	  conclusions	   concerning	   the	   nature	   of	   transnational	   health	   law	   and	   the	   future	  research	  agenda	  in	  the	  field	  of	  transnational	  law.	  
TRANSNATIONAL	   REPRODUCTIVE	   HEALTH	   LAW	   AS	   A	   PRIVATE	   GLOBAL	  
FRAGMENT	  
1. Invisibilisation	  of	  single	  persons	  in	  fertility	  treatment	  in	  the	  UK	  There	   is	   a	   growing	   body	   of	   evidence	   that	   suggests	   that	   the	   number	   of	   single	  persons	  who	  use	  assisted	  reproduction	  technologies	  (ARTs)	  when	  they	  want	  to	  become	   parents	   is	   rising.48	  A	   single	  woman	  who	   chooses	   fertility	   treatment	   to	  become	  pregnant	  will	  usually	  use	  a	  donor	  sperm.	  A	  single	  man	  wishing	  to	  have	  a	  child	  in	  this	  way	  will	  have	  to	  use	  a	  surrogate	  and	  will	  either	  use	  the	  surrogate’s	  ovum	   and	   his	   sperm,	   or	   she	  will	   carry	   an	   embryo	   created	   by	   his	   sperm	   and	   a	  donated	   egg.	  Women	   who	   for	   whatever	   reason	   cannot	   undergo	   IVF	   or	   fall	  pregnant	   themselves	  might	   also	  wish	   to	  use	   a	   surrogate.	   In	   cases	   like	   this,	   the	  single	  woman’s	  ova	  and	  donated	  sperm	  will	  usually	  be	  used	  to	  create	  an	  embryo	  later	  placed	  in	  the	  surrogate’s	  womb	  and	  carried	  by	  her	  to	  term.	  The	  surrogate	  therefore	  does	  not	  use	  her	  own	  eggs,	  and	  is	  genetically	  unrelated	  to	  the	  baby.	  In	  the	   UK	   this	   area	   of	   biomedicine	   is	   regulated	   by	   the	   Human	   Fertilisation	   and	  Embryology	  Act	  1990	   (HFE	  Act	  1990,	   as	   amended	  by	   the	  HFEA	  2008)	  and	   the	  Surrogacy	   Arrangements	   Act	   1985.	   	  Neither	   of	   these	   Acts	   expressly	   mentions	  single	  persons	  as	  a	  separate	  class	  of	  patients.	  Neither	  has	  ever	  prevented	  single	  persons	  from	  accessing	  assisted	  reproduction	  technologies	  as	  such.	  This	  means	  that	  in	  principle,	  single	  persons	  can	  undergo	  IVF	  and	  use	  surrogacy	  offered	  by	  a	  UK	   fertility	  clinic.49	  However,	   they	   face	  a	  major	  obstacle	  once	   the	  child	   is	  born,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  A.	  Krajewska,	  Access	  of	  single	  women	  to	  fertility	  treatment:	  a	  case	  of	  incidental	  discrimination?	  (2015)	  23	  Medical	  Law	  Review	  4,	  620-­‐645;	  S.	  Graham,	  ’Choosing	  single	  motherhood?	  Single	  women	  negotiating	  the	  nuclear	  family	  ideal’,	  in:	  D.	  Cutas	  &	  Chan	  S.	  (eds.),	  Families:	  Beyond	  the	  
nuclear	  ideal	  (London:	  Bloomsbury	  Academic	  2012),	  97-­‐109;	  S.	  Golombok,	  et	  al.	  ‘Single	  Mothers	  by	  Choice:	  Mother–Child	  Relationships	  and	  Children’s	  Psychological	  Adjustment.’	  (2016)	  30	  
Journal	  of	  Family	  Psychology	  4,	  409–418;	  Symposium:	  Men,	  Fertility	  and	  Assisted	  Reproductive	  Technologies	  (2013)	  27	  Reproductive	  BioMedicine	  Online	  3,	  223-­‐322.	  49	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  their	  treatment	  will	  be	  funded	  by	  the	  state.	  Resource	  allocation	  in	  the	  NHS	  at	  the	  local	  level	  falls	  within	  the	  remit	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  Clinical	  Commissioning	  Groups	  (CCGs),	  which	  set	  eligibility	  criteria	  for	  funding	  fertility	  treatment	  in	  their	  fertility	  policies.	  These	  policies	  vary	  greatly	  across	  the	  country	  and	  pose	  separate	  challenges.	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because	   under	   the	   current	   legislation	   they	   are	   not	   be	   able	   to	   establish	   legal	  parenthood	  with	  regard	  to	  their	  children	  born	  out	  of	  surrogacy.	  	  This	   is	  due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  according	   to	   the	  HFE	  Act	  1990	  (as	  amended	  by	   the	  HFE	  Act	  2008)	  the	  woman	  giving	  birth	  to	  a	  child	  is	  considered	  its	  legal	  mother.	  This	  means	   that	   the	   surrogate	  will	   always	   initially	  be	   treated	  as	   the	  mother	  of	  the	  child	  born	  via	  surrogacy.	  If	  she	  is	  married,	  her	  husband	  will	  be	  presumed	  to	  be	   the	   legal	   father.50	  The	   HFE	   Act	   2008	   establishes	   mechanisms,	   based	   on	  consent,	   in	   which	   this	   assumption	   can	   be	   rebutted.	   It	   also	   sets	   out	   additional	  ways	   in	   which	   legal	   parenthood	   can	   be	   attributed	   to	   other	   parties	   directly	   or	  indirectly	   involved	   in	   fertility	   treatment.	   The	   detailed	   conditions	   of	   these	  mechanisms	  are	  outlined	  in	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘agreed	  parenthood’	  provisions,	  which	  form	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  2008	  Act.51	  However,	  because	  surrogacy	  has	  always	  been	  seen	  as	  a	  more	  complicated	  procedure,	  in	  that	  it	  involves	  the	  surrogate	  and	  the	   intended	  parents	   (who	  will	   often	   also	   be	   the	   gamete	   donors),	   the	  HFE	  Act	  2008	  established	  special	  rules	  concerning	  the	  transfer	  of	  legal	  parenthood	  from	  the	  surrogate	  to	  the	  intended	  parents	  after	  the	  birth	  of	  the	  child.52	  Couples	  using	  surrogacy	  can	  apply	   for	  parental	  orders	   to	  acquire	   legal	  parenthood	  over	   their	  child	   within	   six	   months	   of	   its	   birth.53	  However,	   both	   single	   men	   and	   single	  women	  using	  surrogacy	  are	  absent	  from	  the	  relevant	  provision	  of	  the	  Act,	  which	  means	  that	  they	  are	  essentially	  denied	  the	  right	  to	  apply	  for	  parental	  orders.	  	  The	   decision	   to	   exclude	   single	   persons	   from	   this	   procedure	   originated	   in	   the	  recommendations	   of	   the	   initial	   report	   concerning	   assisted	   reproduction	  prepared	  by	  the	  Warnock	  Committee	  in	  1984.	  However,	  it	  was	  confirmed	  during	  the	   Parliamentary	   debates	   over	   the	   2008	   reforms	   of	   the	   HFE	   Act	   1990.	  Consequently,	  section	  54(1)	  HFE	  Act	  2008,	  setting	  out	  the	  principles	  concerning	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  S.	  33	  HFE	  Act	  2008.	  51	  S.	  37-­‐44	  HFE	  Act	  2008.	  For	  detailed	  discussion	  see:	  J.	  McCandless	  and	  S.	  Sheldon,	  ‘The	  Human	  Fertilisation	  and	  Embryology	  Act	  (2008)	  and	  the	  Tenacity	  of	  the	  Sexual	  Family	  Form’	  (2010)	  73	  
Modern	  Law	  Review	  2,	  175-­‐207;	  K.	  Horsey,	  and	  S.	  Sheldon,	  ‘Still	  Hazy	  after	  all	  these	  years:	  The	  Law	  Regulating	  Surrogacy’	  (2012)	  20	  Medical	  Law	  Review	  1,	  67-­‐89.	  52	  S.	  54	  HFE	  Act	  2008	  in	  conjunction	  with	  S.	  35-­‐47	  HFE	  Act	  2008.	  A	  parental	  order	  under	  section	  54	  of	  the	  HFE	  Act	  2008	  may	  be	  made	  where:	  (1)	  an	  application	  is	  made	  by	  a	  married	  couple,	  civil	  
partners	  of	  each	  other,	  or	  two	  persons	  who	  are	  living	  as	  partners	  in	  an	  enduring	  family	  relationship	  and	  are	  not	  within	  prohibited	  degrees	  of	  relationship	  in	  relation	  to	  each	  other;	  (2)	  the	  child	  has	  been	  carried	  by	  a	  woman	  other	  than	  one	  of	  the	  applicants	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  placing	  in	  her	  of	  an	  embryo	  or	  sperm	  and	  eggs	  or	  her	  artificial	  insemination;	  (3)	  the	  gametes	  of	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  applicants	  were	  used	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  embryo;(4)	  an	  application	  is	  made	  within	  six	  months	  of	  the	  birth	  of	  the	  child;(5)	  the	  child’s	  home	  is	  with	  the	  applicants	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  application	  and	  at	  the	  time	  the	  order	  is	  made;	  (6)	  either	  or	  both	  of	  the	  applicants	  is	  domiciled	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  or	  the	  Channel	  Islands	  or	  the	  Isle	  of	  Man	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  application	  and	  at	  the	  time	  the	  order	  is	  made;(7)	  both	  the	  applicants	  have	  attained	  the	  age	  of	  18	  by	  the	  time	  the	  order	  is	  made;(8)	  the	  woman	  who	  carried	  the	  child	  and	  any	  other	  person	  who	  is	  a	  parent	  (including	  a	  person	  treated	  as	  the	  father	  or	  parent	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  relevant	  legislation)	  have	  freely,	  and	  with	  full	  understanding	  of	  what	  is	  involved,	  agreed	  unconditionally	  to	  the	  making	  of	  the	  order.	  	  53	  S.	  54	  (3)	  HFE	  Act	  2008	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parental	  orders,	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  a	  claim	  for	  a	  parental	  order	  can	  only	  be	  made	  by	   two	  people.	  54	  This	   implies	  a	  couple,	  whether	  heterosexual	  or	  same-­‐sex,	  and	  excludes	  single	  men	  and	  women.	  As	  argued	  elsewhere,	  this	  continuous	  exclusion	  has	   been	   the	   result	   of	   decades	   of	   marginalisation	   of	   single	   persons	   in	   family	  life.55	  In	  the	  context	  of	  assisted	  reproduction,	  it	  is	  further	  reproduced	  in	  the	  way	  in	   which	   NHS	   funding	   is	   allocated.	   Clinical	   Commissioning	   Groups	   (CCGs)	  responsible	   for	   resource	   allocation	   at	   the	   regional	   level	   will	   often	   deny	   single	  persons	  (especially	  single	  men	  and	  women	  in	  need	  of	  surrogacy)	  the	  opportunity	  to	   use	   NHS	   funding	   to	   access	   fertility	   treatment.56	  This	   means	   that	   the	   only	  option	   for	   single	   men	   and	   women	   in	   need	   of	   surrogacy	   is	   to	   seek	   treatment	  privately	  in	  the	  UK	  or	  travel	  abroad.	  The	  financial	  hurdles	  exist	  independently	  of	  the	   inability	   to	   apply	   for	   parental	   orders	   to	   establish	   parental	   responsibilities	  with	   regard	   to	   their	   children	   born	   via	   surrogacy	   and	   they	   exacerbate	   the	  problem	  of	  possible	  exclusion.	  Most	  single	  persons	  who	  wish	  to	  have	  biologically	  linked	   children	  who	  need	   to	  use	   fertility	   treatment	  will	   therefore	  have	   to	   seek	  treatment	  in	  private	  fertility	  clinics,	  and	  those	  who	  also	  need	  a	  surrogate	  will	  not	  be	   able	   to	   establish	   legal	   parenthood.	   Most	   of	   these	   relationship	   will	   thus	   be	  governed	  by	  commercial	  contracts	  and	  agreements,	  i.e.	  private	  law.	  	  Consequently,	   although	   neither	   the	  HFE	  Act	   1990,	   nor	   the	  HFE	  Act	   2008	   have	  ever	  precluded	  single	  persons	  from	  accessing	  fertility	  treatment,	   for	  years	  they	  have	   remained	   ‘unintelligible	  within	   the	   legal	   norms’57	  and	   largely	   invisible	   to	  the	  regulators	  and	  providers	  of	  ART	  services.58	  Nevertheless,	  despite	  these	  legal	  and	  policy	   limitations,	   anecdotal	   evidence	   collected	   by	   surrogacy	   agencies	   and	  law	   firms	   specializing	   in	   family	   law	   suggests	   that	   there	   are	   single	   men	   and	  women	  who	  have	  become	  single	  parents	  using	  ARTs	  (in	  the	  UK	  or	  abroad)	  and	  who	   live	   with	   their	   families	   in	   the	   UK.59	  They	   often	   remain	   lost	   and	   largely	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  HFEA	  Information	  about	  the	  changes	  to	  parenthood	  provisions	  from	  2010.	  From	  2010,	  male	  homosexual	  couples	  could	  apply	  for	  parental	  orders	  following	  surrogacy	  arrangements:	  http://www.hfea.gov.uk/2927.html#2	  	  55	  K.	  Holden,	  The	  Shadow	  of	  Marriage:	  Singleness	  in	  England	  1914-­‐1960,	  (Manchester	  University	  Press	  2007);	  S.	  Budgeon,	  Couple	  Culture	  and	  the	  Production	  of	  Singleness	  (2008)	  11	  Sexualities	  3,	  301–325.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  assisted	  reproduction	  see:	  A.	  Krajewska,	  Access	  of	  single	  women	  to	  fertility	  treatment:	  a	  case	  of	  incidental	  discrimination?	  (2015)	  23	  Medical	  Law	  Review	  4,	  620-­‐645	  and	  A.	  Krajewska	  and	  R.	  Cahill-­‐O’Callaghan,	  When	  a	  single	  man	  wants	  to	  be	  a	  father	  –	  the	  invisible	  
subjects	  in	  the	  law	  regulating	  fertility	  treatment	  –	  unpublished	  monograph.	  	  	  56	  A.	  Krajewska	  and	  R.	  Cahill-­‐O’Callaghan,	  ibidem.	  57	  N.	  Naffine,	  ‘Can	  Women	  be	  Legal	  Persons?’	  in:	  S.	  James	  &	  S.	  Palmer	  (eds),	  Visible	  Women,	  (Oxford:	  Hart	  Publishing	  2002),	  80.	  58	  For	  instance,	  research	  conducted	  between	  2016-­‐2017	  confirmed	  that	  the	  HFEA	  does	  not	  hold	  any	  data	  concerning	  the	  number	  of	  single	  men	  seeking	  or	  receiving	  treatment	  in	  the	  UK.	  HFEA	  FOI	  response	  F-­‐2016-­‐00174,	  25	  July	  2017.	  See	  also:	  A.	  Krajewska,	  R.	  Cahill-­‐O’Callaghan,	  note	  55	  above.	  	  59	  See:	  Brilliant	  Beginnings	  Adoption	  Agency:	  	  http://www.brilliantbeginnings.co.uk/intended-­‐parents/single-­‐dad	  or	  Natalie	  Gamble	  Associates:	  http://www.nataliegambleassociates.co.uk/knowledge-­‐centre?user_type=single-­‐men&service=surrogacy.	  	  Also	  see:	  H.	  Prosser,	  N.	  Gamble,	  ‘Modern	  surrogacy	  practice	  and	  the	  need	  for	  reform’	  (2016)	  4	  Journal	  of	  Medical	  Law	  and	  Ethics	  3,	  257-­‐274	  and	  N.	  Gamble,	  ‘Crossing	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invisible	   in	  what	   could	   be	   called	   the	   realm	   of	   interstitial	   legality.	   The	   latter	   is	  defined	   as	   a	   space	   where	   despite	   numerous	   often-­‐overlapping	   national	   and	  international	  public	  and	  private	  norms,	  subjects	  find	  themselves	  in	  a	  space	  of	  a	  legal	  void,	  in-­‐between	  different	  jurisdictions,	  in-­‐between	  binding	  and	  non-­‐binding	  legal	  norms,	  or	  even	  in-­‐between	  legal	  and	  non-­‐legal	  normative	  orders.	  In	  the	  case	  of	   cross-­‐border	   ARTs,	   interstitial	   legality	   forms	   a	   part	   of	   transnational	  reproductive	  health	  law	  entangled	  with	  the	  ever-­‐expanding	  spheres	  of	  globalised	  markets,	  science,	  and	  medicine.	  The	  following	  section	  analyses	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  occurs.	  
2. Single	  persons	  as	  invisible	  subjects	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  interstitial	  legality	  Single	   persons,	   who	   require	   the	   assistance	   of	   a	   surrogate,	   have	   to	   face	   the	  general	   challenges	  posed	  by	   the	   law	  regulating	   surrogacy	   in	   the	  UK.	  The	   latter	  has	   been	   criticised	   as	   complex	   and	   ‘thoroughly	   confused’. 60 	  The	   main	  complications	  result	  from	  the	  lack	  of	  enforceability	  of	  the	  surrogacy	  agreements	  and	  the	  problem	  (and	  criminalisation)	  of	  commercialization	  of	  surrogacy.61	  First	  of	  all,	  while	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  surrogacy	  agreements	  are	  successfully	  fulfilled62,	  the	  agreements	  depend	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  on	  the	  trust	  between	  parties	  and	  carry	  some	  deal	  of	  uncertainty63.	  Secondly,	  in	  the	  UK	  it	  is	  an	  offence	  for	  anyone	  other	  than	   the	   surrogate	   and	   the	   intended	   parents	   to	   negotiate	   a	   surrogacy	  arrangement	   ‘on	   a	   commercial	   basis’,	   and	   it	   is	   a	   criminal	   offence	   for	   intended	  parents,	  surrogates	  and	  agencies	  to	  advertise	  their	  willingness	  to	  participate	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  the	  line:	  the	  legal	  and	  ethical	  problems	  of	  foreign	  surrogacy’	  (2009)	  19	  Reproductive	  BioMedicine	  
Online	  2,	  151-­‐2;	  Most	  recently,	  for	  a	  private	  account	  of	  the	  experiences	  of	  single	  persons	  in	  surrogacy	  (including	  a	  changing	  relationship	  status),	  see:	  J.	  Phillip,	  Surrogacy:	  Our	  Family's	  
Journey	  (Leicester:	  Matador	  2017).	  	  60	  M.	  Warnock,	  ‘Making	  Babies:	  Is	  There	  a	  Right	  to	  Have	  Children?’	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  2002),	  91.	  61	  K.	  Horsey	  and	  S.	  Sheldon	  ‘Still	  hazy	  after	  all	  these	  years?	  The	  law	  regulating	  surrogacy’	  (2012)	  20	  Medical	  Law	  Review	  1,	  67-­‐89;	  N.	  Gambie,	  ‘Crossing	  the	  line:	  the	  legal	  and	  ethical	  problems	  of	  foreign	  surrogacy’	  (2009)	  19	  Reproductive	  BioMedicine	  Online	  2,	  151-­‐2;	  J.	  Tobin,	  ‘To	  prohibit	  or	  permit:	  What	  is	  the	  (human)	  rights	  response	  to	  the	  practice	  of	  international	  commercial	  surrogacy?’	  (2014)	  63	  International	  and	  Comparative	  Law	  Quarterly	  2,	  317-­‐352;	  M.	  Brazier	  A.	  Campbell,	  S.	  Golombok,	  Surrogacy:	  Review	  for	  Health	  Ministers	  of	  Current	  Arrangements	  for	  
Payments	  and	  Regulation.	  Report	  of	  the	  Review	  Team.	  (The	  Brazier	  Report).	  London:	  Department	  of	  Health;	  1998;	  available	  at:	  http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/dh_4014373.pdf.	  	  62	  H.	  Prosser,	  N.	  Gamble,	  Modern	  surrogacy	  practice	  and	  the	  need	  for	  reform,	  (2016)	  4	  Journal	  of	  
Medical	  Law	  and	  Ethics	  3,	  257-­‐274.	  63	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  Surrogacy	  UK	  Working	  Group	  on	  Surrogacy	  Law	  Reform	  recommended	  a	  number	  of	  specific	  changes,	  including	  the	  pre-­‐authorisation	  of	  parental	  orders	  so	  that	  legal	  parenthood	  is	  conferred	  on	  intended	  parents	  at	  birth	  and	  the	  inclusion	  of	  single	  persons	  in	  the	  parenthood	  provisions.	  The	  Surrogacy	  UK	  Working	  Group	  on	  Surrogacy	  Law	  Reform	  also	  suggested	  that	  c)	  Parental	  orders	  should	  be	  available	  to	  single	  persons	  and	  to	  intended	  parents	  where	  neither	  partner	  has	  used	  their	  own	  gametes	  (‘double	  donation’).	  See:	  K.	  Horsey	  ‘Surrogacy	  in	  the	  UK:	  Myth	  busting	  and	  reform’	  Report	  of	  the	  Surrogacy	  UK	  Working	  Group	  on	  Surrogacy	  Law	  Reform	  (Surrogacy	  UK,	  November	  2015).	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or	   facilitate	   surrogacy.	  64	  As	   a	   result,	  websites	   and	   online	   support	   groups	   have	  emerged	  within	  the	  UK,	  where	  potential	  gamete	  donors	  and	  surrogate	  mothers	  make	   contact	   with	   intended	   parents.	   Members	   of	   these	   forums	   make	   private	  arrangements	  that	  are	  intended	  to	  lead	  to	  the	  birth	  of	  a	  child,	  but	  they	  do	  so	  in	  a	  regulatory	  vacuum.	  The	  matching	  methods	  are	  almost	  entirely	  informal	  and	  fall	  outside	  the	  law.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  ART	  services	  accompanying	  surrogacy	  will	  normally	  be	  governed	  by	  an	  array	  of	  public	  and	  private	   law,	   i.e.	   the	  regulatory	  framework	   established	  HFE	  Act	   1990	   (as	   amended	   by	   the	  HFE	  Act	   2008)	   and	  private	  contracts	  for	  the	  provision	  of	  health	  services	  delivered	  by	  private	  fertility	  clinics.	  The	  lack	  of	  formalized	  institutional	  support,	  the	  shortage	  of	  surrogates	  in	  the	  UK,	  and	   the	   length	  of	   the	  whole	  process	  are	   likely	   to	  be	  an	  escalating	   factor	   in	   the	  decision	  to	  travel	  abroad.65	  Although the	  full	  extent	  of	  cross-­‐border	  reproductive	  care	   is	  not	  precisely	  known,	   research	   cited	  by	   the	  European	  Society	  of	  Human	  Reproduction	   and	   Embryology	   (ESHRE)	   suggests	   that	   that	   around	   5%	   of	   all	  fertility	   care	   in	   Europe	   and	   almost	   3%	   of	   all	   US	   cycles	   involves	   cross-­‐border	  patients,	   with	   numbers	   being	   most	   probably	   higher	   in	   specialized	   procedures	  such	  as	  surrogacy.66	  Commercial	  surrogacy	  has	  been	  mainly	  practiced	   in	   Israel,	  and	   in	   the	   state	   of	   California	   (USA),	   where	   surrogacy	   births	   are	   primarily	  managed	   by	   private,	   commercial	   agencies	   that	   screen,	   match,	   and	   regulate	  agreements	   according	   to	   their	   own	   criteria	   and	   without	   state	   interference.67	  Treatments	   are	   also	   economic	   and	   legal	   transactions,	  which	  often	   fall	   between	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  H.	  Prosser,	  N.	  Gamble,	  ‘Modern	  surrogacy	  practice	  and	  the	  need	  for	  reform’	  (2016)	  4	  Journal	  of	  
Medical	  Law	  and	  Ethics	  3,	  257-­‐274;	  N.	  Gambie,	  ‘Crossing	  the	  line:	  the	  legal	  and	  ethical	  problems	  of	  foreign	  surrogacy’	  Reproductive	  (2009)	  19	  BioMedicine	  Online	  2,	  151-­‐2.	  65	  H.	  Prosser,	  N.	  Gamble,	  ‘Modern	  surrogacy	  practice	  and	  the	  need	  for	  reform’	  (2016)	  4	  Journal	  of	  
Medical	  Law	  and	  Ethics	  3,	  257-­‐274.	  66	  European	  Society	  of	  Human	  Reproduction	  and	  Embryology,	  Fact	  Sheets	  1	  January	  2017,	  available	  at:	  https://www.eshre.eu/~/media/sitecore-­‐files/Press-­‐room/Resources/1-­‐CBRC.pdf?la=en.	  Also	  see:	  F.	  Shenfeld	  et	  al.	  ‘The	  ESHRE	  taskforce	  on	  cross	  border	  reproductive	  care.	  Cross	  border	  reproductive	  care	  in	  six	  European	  countries.’	  (2010)	  25	  Human	  Reproduction,	  1361–8.	  The	  literature	  addressing	  the	  growing	  phenomenon	  of	  cross-­‐border	  surrogacy	  is	  vast	  and	  it	  includes	  e.g.	  F.W.	  Twine,	  Outsourcing	  the	  womb:	  Race,	  class	  and	  gestational	  surrogacy	  in	  
a	  global	  market	  (New	  York/London:	  Routledge	  2015);	  R.	  Cook	  et	  al	  (eds),	  Surrogate	  Motherhood:	  
International	  Perspectives	  (Oxford:	  Hart	  Publishing	  2003);	  W.	  Chavkin	  and	  J.	  Maher	  (eds)	  The	  
globalization	  of	  motherhood:	  Deconstructions	  and	  reconstructions	  of	  biology	  and	  care	  (New	  York:	  Routledge	  2010);	  L.	  Culley	  and	  N.	  Hudson,	  ‘Fertility	  Tourists	  or	  Global	  Consumers?	  A	  Sociological	  Agenda	  for	  Exploring	  Cross-­‐border	  Reproductive	  Travel’	  (2010)	  4	  International	  Journal	  of	  
Interdisciplinary	  Social	  Sciences	  10,	  139-­‐50.	  67	  	  Until	  recently	  India	  was	  one	  of	  the	  main	  destinations	  for	  British	  patients.	  See:	  A.	  Pande,	  ‘Commercial	  Surrogacy	  in	  India:	  Manufacturing	  a	  Perfect	  Mother-­‐Worker’,	  (2010)	  35	  Signs	  4,	  969-­‐992.	  However,	  recent	  changes	  to	  the	  law	  have	  banned	  surrogacy	  for	  unmarried	  couples	  and	  single	  persons.	  In	  addition,	  the	  Surrogacy	  (Regulation)	  Bill	  2016	  aims	  to	  ban	  commercial	  surrogacy	  and	  aim	  introduce	  more	  restrictions	  for	  surrogates	  and	  intended	  parents.	  See:	  Surrogacy	  (Regulation)	  Bill	  2016,	  available	  at:	  http://www.prsindia.org/billtrack/the-­‐surrogacy-­‐regulation-­‐bill-­‐2016-­‐4470/	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national	  and	  international	  law.68	  Single	   persons	   who	   decide	   to	   seek	   treatment	   overseas	   will	   often	   choose	  jurisdictions	  where	  rules	  regulating	  parenthood	  are	  more	  beneficial	  to	  intended	  parents,	  e.g.	  in	  the	  USA	  the	  single	  man	  can	  be	  registered	  on	  the	  birth	  certificate	  of	  his	  child.69	  However,	  international	  surrogacy	  presents	  its	  own	  distinct	  challenges	  with	  regard	   to	   the	  establishment	  of	   legal	  parenthood.	  The	  process	   for	  bringing	  the	   child	   born	   from	   surrogacy	   to	   the	   UK	   can	   be	   very	   long,	   costly,	   and	  convoluted.70	  International	   surrogacy	   is	   further	   complicated	   by	   the	   fact	   that	  parenthood	  and	  nationality	  are	  separate	  legal	  institutions.	  In	  particular,	   foreign	  family	   law	   does	   not	   have	   an	   effect	   in	   the	   UK	   and	   the	   UK	   nationality	   law	   and	  English	  family	  law	  are	  governed	  by	  different	  rules.71	  This	  means	  that,	  even	  if	  the	  child	  (born	  abroad)	   is	  entitled	  to	  British	  nationality	  based	  on	  the	  nationality	  of	  his/her	  intended	  parent,	  the	  latter	  will	  not	  be	  automatically	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  child’s	  legal	  parent.	  This	  is	  also	  true	  when	  the	  parenthood	  has	  been	  established	  in	   the	   country	   where	   the	   child	   was	   born.72	  As	   a	   result,	   in	   situations	   where	  parental	   rights	   and	   responsibilities	   have	   been	   officially	   acknowledged	   in	   one	  country,	  but	  not	  recognised	  in	  another,	  some	  families	  continue	  their	  lives	  under	  the	  surface,	   in	  a	  grey	  area	  between	   law	  and	  non-­‐law,	   in	   the	  state	  of	   interstitial	  
legality.	  	  This	  realm	  of	  interstitial	   legality	  emerges	  as	  one	  of	  the	  results	  of	  the	  expansion	  and	   ‘inward	   explosion’	   of	   the	   reproductive	   health	   care	   system	   as	   it	   is	   coupled	  with	  the	  system	  of	  free	  market	  economy.	  Prima	  facie	  the	  system	  is	  released	  from	  the	   constraints	   of	   domestic	   legislators	   and	   escapes	   political	   power.73 	  Many	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  R.	  Scherman	  et	  al.	  ‘Global	  commercial	  surrogacy	  and	  international	  adoption:	  parallels	  and	  differences’	  (2016)	  40	  Adoption	  &	  Fostering	  1,	  20	  –	  35.	  69	  For	  instance	  in	  California	  law	  is	  very	  favourable	  to	  surrogacy.	  In	  rulings	  of	  the	  California	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  cases	  of	  Calvert	  v.	  Johnson	  (1993)	  and	  Buzzanca	  v.	  Buzzanca	  (1998),	  California	  first	  established	  and	  then	  reinforced	  its	  position	  that	  intent	  governs	  in	  the	  determination	  of	  parentage	  in	  gestational	  surrogacy	  situations.	  See:	  E.	  Sills	  (ed),	  Handbook	  of	  Gestational	  
Surrogacy:	  International	  Clinical	  Practice	  and	  Policy	  Issues	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press	  2016),	  285.	  70	  Contrary	  to	  misconceptions,	  the	  mean	  overall	  cost	  of	  surrogacy	  is	  much	  higher	  than	  for	  surrogacy	  in	  the	  UK.	  See	  Horsey	  (2015),	  ibidem.	  71	  British	  Nationality	  Act	  1981,	  c	  61.	  Also	  see:	  Home	  Office,	  Nationality	  policy:	  surrogacy,	  London	  July	  2017,	  available	  at:	  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/surrogacy-­‐nationality-­‐policy-­‐guidance.	  72	  Foreign	  &	  Commonwealth	  Office,	  Surrogacy	  Overseas	  guidance,	  London	  June	  2014,	  available	  at:	  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/surrogacy-­‐overseas.	  73	  This	  has	  been	  well	  reflected	  in	  the	  Explanatory	  Memorandum	  to	  the	  Draft	  Recommendation	  on	  the	  Children’s	  Rights	  related	  to	  Surrogacy	  adopted	  by	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  which	  admitted	  that	  the	  Parliamentary	  Assembly	  as	  a	  whole	  is	  ‘probably	  (…)	  too	  divided	  on	  the	  human	  rights	  and	  ethical	  issues	  related	  to	  surrogacy	  to	  find	  anything	  but	  circumstantial	  majorities	  in	  relation	  to	  some	  of	  the	  issues	  at	  stake’.	  In	  particular,	  the	  Rapeurter	  Ms	  R.	  de	  Sutter,	  stated	  that	  she	  does	  ‘no	  longer	  believe	  that	  such	  a	  majority	  exists	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  altruistic	  surrogacy	  arrangements	  should	  be	  allowed,	  nor	  on	  whether	  we	  should	  encourage	  States	  which	  do	  allow	  for-­‐profit	  surrogacy	  arrangements	  to	  set	  minimum	  standards	  with	  a	  view	  to	  protecting	  surrogate	  mothers	  and	  surrogate-­‐born	  children	  from	  abuse.’	  See:	  Council	  of	  Europe’s	  Committee	  on	  Social	  Affairs,	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domestic	   decision-­‐makers	   choose	   criminalisation	   and	   exclusion	   as	   a	   way	   of	  dealing	   with	   the	   contingencies	   brought	   about	   by	   the	   advances	   in	   the	   field	   of	  science	  and	  medicine.74	  This	  in	  turn	  leads	  to	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  system	  of	  cross-­‐border	   reproductive	   health	   care	   that	   can	   result	   in	   a	   crisis.	   Several	   such	   crises	  have	   been	   reported	   across	   the	   globe,	   for	   instance	   when	   transnational	  commercial	   surrogacy	  was	   seen	   as	   exploitative	   and	   highly	   disadvantageous	   to	  ‘poor	   and	   uneducated’	   women,	   who	   act	   as	   surrogates	   in	   India	   and	   other	   less	  developed	  countries.75	  Another	  example	  concerns	  the	  problems	  described	  above	  concerning	   the	   parental	   rights	   over	   children	   born	   as	   a	   result	   of	   cross-­‐border	  assisted	   reproduction,	   in	   which	   children	   and	   their	   parents	   are	   left	   without	  sufficient	  protection.76	  	  
3. Private	   constitutionalisation	   of	   the	   transnational	   reproductive	   health	  
regime	  The	   foregoing	   analysis	   of	   the	   legal	   status	   of	   single	   persons	   in	   the	   context	   of	  fertility	   treatment	   seems	   to	   confirm	   Teubner’s	   theory	   concerning	  autonomisation	   and	   the	   expansion	   of	   private	   sectors	   in	   world	   society.	  Furthermore,	   observed	   from	   this	   perspective,	   it	   is	   arguable	   that	   the	   ‘inward	  explosion’	   of	   the	   system	   of	   transnational	   health	   law	   that	   resulted	   in	   crisis,	  triggered	   jurisgenerative	  potentials	   aimed	  at	   the	   self-­‐limitation,	   and	  eventually	  the	   self-­‐constitutionalisation	   of	   this	   ‘societal	   fragment’.	   According	   to	   Teubner,	  ‘global	   fragments’	   should	   be	   able	   to	   develop	   their	   own	   fundamental	   standards	  and	   rules	   regarding	   system-­‐specific	   access	   conditions	   without	   recourse	   to	  national	   level	   jurisdiction.	   The	   growing	   autonomy	   and	   private	  constitutionalisation	   of	   the	   system	   of	   transnational	   reproductive	   health	   law	   is	  exemplified	  in	  the	  attempts	  to	  develop	  global	  and	  regional	  standards	  concerning	  ART	  services,	  including	  surrogacy.	  	  The	   field	   is	   increasingly	   regulated	   by	   international	   soft-­‐law	   instruments	   and	  principles	   of	   professional	   practice.	   The	   number	   and	   diversity	   of	   these	  instruments	  produced	  by	  various	  professional	   and	   supranational	  organisations	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Health	  and	  Sustainable	  Development,	  Children’s	  rights	  related	  to	  surrogacy	  (Council	  of	  Europe	  2016).	  74	  This	  situation	  will	  be	  exacerbated	  in	  national	  settings,	  in	  which	  all	  forms	  of	  surrogacy	  are	  criminalised,	  e.g.	  in	  France,	  Germany,	  Italy,	  Spain.	  75	  K	  Schanbacher,	  ‘India's	  Gestational	  Surrogacy	  Market:	  An	  Exploitation	  of	  Poor,	  Uneducated	  Women’,	  (2014)	  25	  Hasting	  Women’s	  Law	  Journal	  2,	  201-­‐220.	  Also	  see:	  F.	  Baylis,	  ‘Transnational	  commercial	  contract	  pregnancy	  in	  India’	  in	  F.	  Baylis	  &	  C.	  McLeod	  (eds)	  Family-­‐making:	  
Contemporary	  Ethical	  Challenges	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2014);	  A.	  Pande,	  ‘Transnational	  commercial	  surrogacy	  in	  India:	  Gifts	  for	  international	  sisters?’,	  Reproductive	  
Biomedicine	  Online	  23	  (2011):	  618–625;	  S.	  Wilkinson,	  Bodies	  for	  Sale:	  Ethics	  and	  Exploitation	  in	  
the	  Human	  Body	  Trade	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2003),	  pp.	  134–181.	  	  76	  E.g.	  AB	  (Surrogacy;	  Domicile)	  [2016]	  EWFC	  63	  (07	  March	  2016);	  CC	  v	  DD	  [2014]	  EWHC	  1307	  (Fam)	  (14	  February	  2014);	  AB	  v	  DE	  [2013]	  EWHC	  2413	  (Fam);	  Re	  A	  &	  B	  (Parental	  Order	  Domicile)	  [2013]	  EWHC	  426	  (Fam);	  Re:	  X	  &	  Y	  (Foreign	  Surrogacy)	  [2008]	  EWHC	  3030	  (Fam).	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are	  overwhelming.	  For	  instance,	  in	  2007,	  the	  International	  Federation	  of	  Fertility	  Societies	   (IFFS)	   set	   itself	   a	   goal	   of	  developing	   a	   series	  of	   Practice	   Standards	  of	  Infertility	   Care	   appropriate	   to	   its	   global	   constituency.77	  In	   2011,	   it	   adopted	  Standard	   13	   entitled	   ‘Cross	   International	   Border	   Treatment	   consistency	   in	  standards’	   which	   aimed	   to	   improve	   access	   to	   high-­‐quality	   and	   safe	   assisted	  conception	   services,	   guaranteeing	   the	   informed	   choice	   of	   the	   patient. 78	  Furthermore,	   in	   2006,	   the	   International	   Committee	   for	   Monitoring	   Assisted	  Reproductive	   Technology	   (ICMART),	   a	   network	   responsible	   for	   the	   collection	  and	  dissemination	  of	  worldwide	  data	  on	  ART,	  published	  the	  first	  glossary	  of	  ART	  terminology.79	  In	  December	  2008,	  the	  WHO,	  with	  the	  assistance	  of	  the	  ICMART,	  the	   Low	   Cost	   IVF	   Foundation	   (LCIVFF)	   and	   the	   International	   Federation	   of	  Fertility	   Societies	   (IFFS),	   organized	   an	   international	  WHO	  meeting	   in	   order	   to	  develop	   an	   internationally	   accepted	   set	   of	   definitions	   that	   would	   help	  standardize	   and	   harmonize	   international	   data	   collection	   to	   monitor	   the	  availability,	  efficacy,	  and	  safety	  of	  ART	  interventions.80	  Many	  of	  these	  documents	  are	  based	  on	  the	  principles	  of	  human	  dignity,	   informed	  consent,	  and	  privacy	  of	  the	   patient.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   specific	   standards	   concerning	   surrogacy	   have	  started	   to	  emerge.	  For	   instance,	   the	  Hague	  Conference	  on	  Private	   International	  Law	   has	   set	   up	   an	   Expert	   Group	   to	   analyse	   private	   international	   law	   issues	  encountered	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  legal	  parentage	  of	  children,	  and	  more	  specifically	  in	  relation	  to	  international	  surrogacy	  arrangements.	  In	  2017	  the	  Group	  reached	  ‘an	  agreement	  in	  principle	  on	  the	  feasibility	  of	  developing	  a	  binding	  multilateral	  instrument	   dealing	   with	   the	   recognition	   of	   foreign	   judicial	   decisions	   on	   legal	  parentage’.81	  At	   the	   end	   of	   that	   year,	   another	   NGO,	   the	   International	   Social	  Service	   (ISS),	  highlighted	  a	   set	  of	  principles	   to	  protect	   the	   rights	  of	   children	   in	  surrogacy	   arrangements,	   including	   human	   dignity,	   the	   right	   to	   identity	   (name,	  nationality	   and	   family	   relations),	   access	   to	   information	   about	   one’s	   origins	   as	  well	   as	   the	   importance	   of	   respecting	   the	   rights	   of	   the	   surrogate	   mother	   and	  intended	  parents.82	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  International	  Federation	  of	  Fertility	  Societies,	  Policy	  Statement	  2:	  Cross	  Border	  Treatment	  (IFFS,	  2010).	  78	  IFFS,	  Policy	  No.	  13:	  Cross	  International	  Border	  Treatment	  consistency	  in	  standards	  (IFFS	  2011):	  http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.iffs-­‐reproduction.org/resource/resmgr/Docs/Standard_13crossborderMarch_.pdf	  	  79	  F.	  Zegers-­‐Hochschild	  et	  al.	  International	  Committee	  for	  Monitoring	  Assisted	  Reproductive	  Technologies.	  The	  ICMART	  glossary	  on	  ART	  terminology	  (2006)	  21	  Human	  Reproduction,	  1968–70.	  	  80	  F.	  Zegers-­‐Hochschild	  et	  al.,	  International	  Committee	  for	  Monitoring	  Assisted	  Reproductive	  Technology	  (ICMART)	  and	  the	  World	  Health	  Organization	  (WHO)	  revised	  glossary	  of	  ART	  terminology,	  2009,	  Fertility	  and	  Sterility	  Vol.	  92,	  No.	  5,	  November	  2009,	  1520-­‐24.	  81	  Permanent	  Bureau	  of	  the	  HCCH	  on	  Private	  International	  Law,	  News	  from	  the	  Hague	  Conference	  on	  Private	  International	  Law:	  Permanent	  Bureau	  of	  the	  HCCH	  on	  Private	  International	  Law,	  Uniform	  Law	  Review,	  Volume	  22,	  Issue	  4,	  1	  December	  2017,	  Pages	  984–995.	  82	  http://www.iss-­‐ssi.org/index.php/en/news1	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At	   the	   regional	   level,	   the	   European	   Society	   of	   Human	   Reproduction	   and	  Embryology	  (ESHRE)	  has	  been	  very	  active	  in	  setting	  professional	  standards	  that	  proved	  influential	  internationally.	  The	  ESHRE	  Task	  Force	  on	  Ethics	  and	  Law	  has	  issued	  several	  Statements	  concerning	  different	  legal	  and	  ethical	  issues	  arising	  in	  the	  context	  of	  ARTs.	   In	  2005	  they	  published	  a	  Statement	  concerning	  surrogacy,	  which	  concluded	   that	  surrogacy	   is	  an	  acceptable	   last-­‐resort	  method	  of	  ART	   for	  specific	   medical	   indications,	   for	   which	   only	   reimbursement	   of	   reasonable	  expenses	  is	  allowed.83	  Most	  recently	  the	  Task	  Force	  commented	  on	  ethical	  issues	  arising	  from	  claims	  to	  assisted	  reproductive	  services	  made	  by	  single	  persons,	  gay	  couples,	   and	   transsexual	   people.	   Importantly	   for	   our	   analysis,	   the	   document	  stresses	   that	   denying	   access	   to	   treatment	   to	   any	   of	   these	   groups	   could	   not	   be	  reconciled	   with	   human	   rights.	   If	   there	   are	   concerns	   about	   the	   implications	   of	  assisted	   reproduction	   on	   the	   wellbeing	   of	   any	   of	   the	   persons	   involved,	   these	  concerns	  have	  to	  be	  considered	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  available	  scientific	  evidence.84	  	  These	  developments	   can	  be	   seen	   as	   confirming	   the	   constitutionalisation	  of	   the	  transnational	  health	  law	  as	  a	  process	  of	  private	  global	  ordering,	  where	  concrete	  standards	  of	   fundamental	   rights	   are	  being	  developed	   incrementally	   and	  where	  fundamental	   rights	   are	   positivised	   beyond	   and	   above	   existing	   international	  politics	   and	   law.85	  However,	   as	   demonstrated	   above	   (and	   argued	   elsewhere86)	  transnational	  health	  law	  and	  its	  self-­‐constitutionalisation	  are	  largely	  hidden	  and	  invisible.	  Legal	  norm	  formation	  belongs	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  private	  law	  and	  is	  contained	  in	  private	  contracts	  agreed	  between	  fertility	  clinics,	  patients	  and,	   where	   required,	   insurance	   companies.	   The	   latency	   of	   private	   law,	   of	   the	  contract,	  has	  been	  explained	  by	  Teubner	  as	  necessary	   for	   its	  construction.	   ‘The	  contract’s	  inter-­‐discursive	  binding	  effect	  must	  remain	  invisible	  to	  contemporary	  society	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  its	  self-­‐description.	  It	  can	  be	  observed	  only	  in	  its	  effects	  on	   the	   economy,	   law,	   and	   production,	   but	   not	   itself	   as	   relationality	   between	  them.	  (…)	  The	  latency	  is	  not	  only	  necessary,	  but	  needs	  to	  be	  secured	  against	  its	  actualization.	  Both	  the	  (constructed)	  object	  and	  the	  latency	  itself	  need	  to	  remain	  invisible	   in	   the	   blind	   spot,	   to	   avoid	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	   construction.’ 87	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  F.Shenfield	  et	  al.,	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Transnational	   principles,	   procedures,	   and	   structures	   develop	   incrementally	  through	  such	  contracts	  and	  through	  professional	  codes	  developed	  by	  healthcare	  professionals	   involved	   in	   the	   delivery	   of	   transnational	   ART	   services.	   These	  developments	   seem	   to	   be	   in	   line	   with	   Teubner’s	   version	   of	   sectorial	  constitutionalism,	   in	   which	   fundamental	   rights	   are	   developed	   through	   various	  interconnected	  channels	  such	  as	  arbitration	  tribunals,	  contracts	  between	  private	  actors,	   or	   pressure	   from	   NGOs.	   The	   vast	   majority	   of	   such	   norms	   and	   their	  addressees	   will	   remain	   invisible.	   In	   Teubner’s	   vision,	   subjects,	   principles,	   and	  structures	   become	   visible	   when	   there	   is	   crisis	   or	   conflict	   destabilising	   the	  system.	   Rules	   that	   are	   adopted	   internally	   by	   the	   system	   form	   sectorial	  constitutions. However,	  at	  this	  point	  transnational	  reproductive	  health	  law	  seems	  to	  depart	  –	  at	  least	  to	  some	  extent	  –	  from	  Teubner’s	  theory	  of	  constitutionalisation	  governed	  by	  private	  law.	  While	  some	  of	  the	  conflicts	  emerging	  in	  the	  context	  of	  ARTs	  may	  be	   resolved	   by	   an	   international	   or	   private	   adjudicative	   body,	   e.g.	   international	  mediators,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  disputes	  have	  so	  far	  been	  decided	  by	  national	  and	  regional	  human	  rights	  courts.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  single	  persons	  in	  fertility	  treatment,	  the	  destabilising	  effects	  of	   the	  expansion	  of	   the	  cross-­‐border	  reproductive	  care	  have	   been	   revealed	   in	   the	   course	   of	   domestic	   litigation.	   The	   analysis	   in	   the	  following	  section	  shows	  that,	  while	   the	  process	  of	  visibilisation	  may	  begin	  –	  as	  proposed	  by	  Teubner	  –	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  private	  law,	  the	  process	  of	  inclusion	  and	  the	  mechanisms	   in	  which	  subjects	  acquire	   legal	   subjectivity	   is	  concluded	   in	   the	  realm	  of	  public	  law.	  The	  following	  analysis	  shows	  how	  this	  inclusionary	  process	  unravelled	  in	  the	  context	  of	  single	  persons	  in	  fertility	  treatment.	  
THE	  PUBLIC	  FACE	  OF	  TRANSNATIONAL	  HEALTH	  LAW	  
1.	  Acquiring	  legal	  subjectivity	  as	  a	  result	  of	  human	  rights	  litigation	  As	   mentioned	   earlier,	   many	   single	   persons	   who	   used	   surrogacy	   to	   become	  parents	   have	   remained	   invisible	   for	   years,	   living	   their	   lives	   in	   a	   state	   of	  
interstitial	  legality.	  They	  have	  recently	  acquired	  visibility	  through	  human	  rights	  litigation	  before	  English	  courts,	   in	  the	  cases	  of	  Re	  Z	  (A	  Child)	  (Surrogate	  Father:	  
Parental	  Order)	  [2015]	   and	  Re	  Z	  (A	  Child)	   (No	  2)	  [2016].	   Both	   cases	   concerned	  the	   same	   applicants,	   i.e.	   a	   child,	   Z,	   conceived	   in	   the	   USA	   with	   the	   applicant	  father's	   sperm	  and	   a	   third	   party	   donor's	   egg	   implanted	   in	   an	   unmarried	  American	  surrogate	  mother,	  and	   the	  single	   father.	  Upon	  their	  return	   to	   the	  UK,	  the	  father	  who	  wished	  to	  establish	  his	   legal	  parenthood	  with	  regard	  to	  his	  son,	  challenged	  S	  54(1)	  of	  the	  2008	  Act	  as	  inconsistent	  with	  Articles	  8	  and	  14	  of	  the	  European	   Convention	   of	   Human	   Rights	   (ECHR).	   It	   was	   argued	   that	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  word	  alone	  is	  seen	  as	  able	  to	  keep	  the	  divergent	  projects	  together.’	  See:	  G.	  Teubner,	  ‘In	  the	  blind	  spot:	  The	  Hybridization	  of	  Contracting’	  (2006)	  8	  Theoretical	  Inquiries	  in	  Law,	  51-­‐71,	  59.	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requirement	   is	   a	   discriminatory	   interference	   with	   a	   single	   person's	   rights	   to	  private	   and	   family	   life,	   because	   it	   does	   not	   allow	   single	   persons	   to	   apply	   for	   a	  parental	  order.	  In	  the	  first	  of	  the	  two	  judgments,	  the	  court	  held	  that	  S	  54	  of	  the	  HFEA	   2008	   could	   not	   be	   read	   down	   to	   enable	   a	   parental	   order	   to	   be	  made	   in	  respect	   of	   a	   single	   applicant.	  The	   court,	   thus,	   rejected	   the	   application	  made	  by	  the	  single	  father	  and	  his	  son	  and	  the	  case	  failed.	  However,	  the	  parties	  involved	  in	  the	  case	  obtained	  visibility	  as	  subjects	  of	  rights	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  family	  life.	  The	  right	  not	  to	  be	  discriminated	  against	  gained	  particular	  importance.	  In	  the	  course	  of	  the	  process	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Health	  conceded	  that	  the	  provision	  was	  incompatible	   with	   Art	   14	   taken	   in	   conjunction	   with	   Art	   8	   of	   the	   ECHR.	   The	  visibilisation	   and	   acknowledgment	   of	   certain	   legal	   entitlements	   by	   the	  government	   enabled	   the	   court	   to	   deliver	   the	   second	   judgment	   and	   make	   a	  declaration	  of	  incompatibility	  of	  sections	  54(1)	  and	  (2)	  of	  the	  HFE	  Act	  2008	  with	  the	  Art	  14	  ECHR	  in	  conjunction	  with	  Art	  8,	  insofar	  as	  they	  prevent	  the	  applicant	  from	   obtaining	   a	   parental	   order	   on	   the	   sole	   ground	   of	   his	   status	   as	   a	   single	  person	  as	  opposed	  to	  being	  part	  of	  a	  couple.	  The	  President	  of	  the	  Family	  Division	  of	   the	   High	   Court,	   Munby	   LJ,	   was	   satisfied	   that	   in	   all	   the	   circumstances	   the	  declaration	   sought	   was	   soundly	   based	   in	   fact	   and	   law.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   he	  declined	  to	  go	  further	  and	  suggest	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  relevant	  provisions	  could	  be	  cured.88	  Consequently,	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  litigation	  has	  done	  nothing	  more	   than	   shed	   light	   onto	   a	   previously	   relatively	   invisible	   group	   of	   subjects.	  However,	  by	  making	  a	  declaration	  of	  incompatibility	  in	  the	  second	  case	  the	  court	  in	   fact	   did	   more	   than	   shed	   light.	   By	   declaring	   provisions	   of	   domestic	   law	  incompatible	  with	  the	  ECHR,	  the	  court	  acknowledged	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  right	  that	  has	  been	  violated	   and	   in	   turn	   allowed	   for	   a	   transformation	  of	   a	  potential	   legal	  subjectivity	   (inherent	   in	   the	   ECHR)	   into	   a	   specific	   legal	   subjectivity	   at	   the	  domestic	   level.	   It	   also	   enabled	   the	  UK	  government	   to	   respond	  and	   remedy	   the	  inconsistencies	  and	  human	  rights	  violations.	  Following	  the	  judgment,	  in	  November	  2017,	  the	  UK	  Government	  laid	  a	  proposal	  before	   Parliament	   to	   allow	   single	   people	   to	   apply	   for	   parental	   orders	   in	   order	  obtain	   parental	   rights	   over	   their	   children	   born	   as	   a	   result	   of	   surrogacy.89	  If	  approved	   by	   Parliament,	   single	   persons	  will	   obtain	   new	   rights,	  which	  will	   put	  them,	   at	   least	   formally,	   on	  equal	   footing	  with	   couples	  who	  become	  parents	  via	  surrogacy.	  As	  a	   result,	   the	  process	  of	  visibilisation	   facilitated	   through	   litigation	  can	   be	   said	   to	   have	   led	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   new	   legal	   subjects	   in	   the	   field	   of	  social	  and	  family	  life.	  This	  emergence	  of	  new	  subjectivity	  will	  undoubtedly	  have	  a	  transformative	  effect	  not	  only	  on	  the	  law	  regulating	  assisted	  reproduction,	  but	  also	   on	   the	   realm	   of	   transnational	   reproductive	   health	   law,	   as	   it	   supports	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  Re	  Z	  (A	  child)	  (No	  2)	  [2016]	  EWHC	  1191	  (Fam),	  paras.	  27-­‐30.	  89	  The	  Government’s	  Response	  to	  an	  incompatibility	  in	  the	  Human	  Fertilisation	  &	  Embryology	  Act	  2008:	  A	  remedial	  order	  to	  allow	  a	  single	  person	  to	  obtain	  a	  parental	  order	  following	  a	  surrogacy	  arrangement,	  Cm	  9525,	  November	  2017,	  available	  at:	  www.gov.uk/government/publications	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further	  expansion	  and	  autonomisation	  of	   the	  system.	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	   the	  factors	   influencing	   this	   inclusionary	  dynamic	  are	  multiple	  and	  complex.	  One	  of	  the	   factors	   that	   facilitated	   the	   inclusion	   of	   single	   persons	   into	   the	   legal	  community	  is	  the	  jurisprudence	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (ECtHR)	  concerning	   the	   protection	   of	   family	   life	   guaranteed	   by	   the	   right	   to	   private	   life	  (Art.	  8	  ECHR),	  the	  right	  to	  found	  a	  family	  (Art.	  12	  ECHR),	  and	  the	  prohibition	  of	  discrimination	  (Art.	  14	  ECHR).	  The	  section	  below	  traces	   the	  ECtHR’s	  reasoning	  that	  led	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  single	  persons	  (and	  their	  children)	  as	  new	  subjects	  of	  transnational	  health	  law.	  	  
2. Visibilisation	  through	  international	  human	  rights	  litigation	  Over	   the	  years,	   the	  case	   law	  of	   the	  ECtHR	  has	  changed	  considerably,	  becoming	  more	   affirming	   of	   different	   family	   constellations	   and	   roles,	   in	   particular	   of	  families	  headed	  by	  single	  persons.	  As	  of	  today	  there	  have	  been	  no	  cases	  before	  the	   ECtHR	   involving	   specifically	   single	   men	   or	   women	   in	   fertility	   treatment.	  However,	   the	   line	   of	   jurisprudence	   concerning	   reproductive	   autonomy 90 ,	  privacy91,	   adoption92	  and	   international	   surrogacy93	  has	   played	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	  shaping	  the	  inclusionary	  processes	  in	  the	  UK.	  	  The	  most	  relevant	  for	  the	  present	  discussions	  is	  the	  case	  of	  Wagner	  and	  J.M.W.L.	  
v	  Luxemburg	  (2007),94	  in	  which	  a	  court	   in	  Luxemburg	  refused	  to	  declare	  a	  fully	  valid	  adoption	  order	  issued	  to	  a	  single	  mother	  by	  a	  Peruvian	  court	  enforceable	  in	  Luxembourg.	  The	   refusal	   stemmed	   from	   the	  absence	  of	  provisions	   in	  domestic	  legislation	   allowing	   single	   parents	   to	   adopt,	   but	   was	   contrary	   to	   the	   accepted	  practice	  of	  automatic	  recognition	  of	  Peruvian	  judgments.	  The	  ECtHR	  considered	  that	  the	  court’s	  refusal	  amounted	  to	  an	  ‘interference’	  with	  the	  right	  to	  respect	  for	  family	   life,	   and	   observed	   that	   a	   broad	   consensus	   existed	   in	   Europe	   allowing	  single	   persons	   to	   adopt	  without	   restrictions.	   The	   Court	   took	   the	   view	   that	   the	  decision	  not	   to	  declare	  the	   judgment	  enforceable	  did	  not	   take	  account	  of	  social	  reality,	   i.e.	   that	   the	  baby	  girl	  was	  already	   living	  with	  her	  adoptive	  mother.	  As	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  Evans	  v	  UK	  (2007),	  46	  EHRR	  34;	  Dickson	  v	  UK	  (2008)	  46	  EHRR	  41;	  Glass	  v.	  UK	  (2004)	  1	  FLR	  1019;	  Tysiąc	  v.	  Poland	  (2007)	  application	  no.	  5410/03;	  Niemietz	  v.	  Germany	  (1992)	  Application	  
no.	  13710/88;	  Pretty	  v.	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  (2002)	  Application	  no.	  2346/02;	  Brüggemann	  and	  
Scheuten	  v.	  Germany	  (1976)	  Application	  No.	  6959/75.	  91	  The	  right	  of	  a	  couple	  to	  conceive	  a	  child	  and	  to	  make	  use	  of	  medically	  assisted	  procreation	  for	  that	  end	  is	  clearly	  an	  expression	  of	  private	  and	  family	  life	  that	  comes	  within	  the	  ambit	  of	  Article	  8.	  However,	  the	  provisions	  of	  Article	  8	  do	  not	  guarantee	  either	  the	  right	  to	  found	  a	  family	  or	  the	  right	  to	  adopt,	  rather,	  it	  presupposes	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  family	  or	  at	  the	  very	  least	  the	  potential	  relationship	  that	  arises	  for	  example	  from	  a	  lawful	  and	  genuine	  adoption.	  See:	  Paradiso	  &	  
Campanelli	  v	  Italy	  (2017)	  ECHR	  96,	  	  §141;	  SH	  v	  Austria	  (2011)	  Application	  no.	  57813/00;	  E.B.	  v.	  France	  (2008),	  Application	  no.	  43546/02.	  92	  Frette	  v	  France	  (2002)	  38	  EHRR	  438;	  E.B.	  v	  France	  (2007)	  ECHR	  211,	  Wagner	  and	  JM	  WL	  v	  
Luxemburg	  (2007)	  Application	  No.	  76240/01,	  Gözüm	  v.	  Turkey	  (2015)	  Application	  no.	  4789/10.	  .	  93	  Labassee	  v.	  France	  (2014),	  Mennesson	  v.	  France	  (2014).	  94	  Wagner	  and	  JM	  WL	  v	  Luxemburg	  (2007),	  Application	  No.	  76240/01.	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result,	   the	   applicants	   encountered	   obstacles	   in	   their	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   lives	   and	   the	  child	  did	  not	  enjoy	  the	  legal	  protection,	  which	  would	  enable	  her	  to	  integrate	  fully	  into	   her	   adoptive	   family.	   Importantly	   for	   the	   present	   discussion,	   the	   Court	  considered	   that	   the	   domestic	   courts	   could	   not	   reasonably	   disregard	   the	   legal	  status	  which	  had	  been	  created	  on	  a	  valid	  basis	   in	  a	   foreign	   country	  and	  which	  corresponded	   to	   family	   life	   within	   the	   meaning	   of	   Article	   8.	   They	   could	   not	  reasonably	   refuse	   to	   recognise	   the	   family	   bond	   which	   de	   facto	   linked	   the	  applicant	  and	  her	  child	  and	  which	  deserved	  full	  protection.	  	  Furthermore,	   the	   Court	   reiterated	   that,	   in	   the	   enjoyment	   of	   the	   rights	   and	  freedoms	   recognised	   by	   the	   Convention,	   Article	   14	   prohibited	   different	  treatment	  of	  persons	   in	   analogous	   situations	  without	  objective	   and	   reasonable	  justification.	   The	   Court	   noted	   that,	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   refusal	   to	   declare	   the	  judgment	  enforceable,	  the	  child	  born	  as	  a	  result	  of	  transnational	  surrogacy	  had	  been	   subjected	   in	   her	   daily	   life	   to	   a	   difference	   in	   treatment	   compared	   with	  children	   whose	   full	   adoption	   granted	   abroad	   was	   recognised	   in	   Luxembourg.	  The	   child’s	   links	   with	   her	   birth	   family	   had	   been	   severed	   and	   had	   not	   been	  replaced	   with	   full	   and	   complete	   links	   with	   her	   adoptive	   mother.	   The	   child	  therefore	   found	  herself	   in	  a	   legal	  vacuum	  and	  Ms	  Wagner	  suffered	   the	   indirect	  consequences	  of	  the	  obstacles	  facing	  her	  child,	  which	  had	  not	  been	  remedied	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  an	  open	  adoption	  had	  been	  granted	  in	  the	  meantime.	  The	  Court	  saw	  no	   justification	   for	   such	   discrimination,	   especially	   since	   prior	   to	   the	   events	   in	  question,	  full	  adoption	  orders	  had	  been	  automatically	  granted	  in	  Luxembourg	  in	  respect	   of	   other	   Peruvian	   children	   adopted	   by	   unmarried	  mothers.	   The	   Court	  therefore	  held	  that	  there	  had	  been	  a	  violation	  of	  Article	  14	  taken	  in	  conjunction	  with	  Article	  8.	  	  In	   two	   other	   cases	   concerning	   the	   registration	   of	   children	   born	   as	   a	   result	   of	  international	   surrogacy	   using	   donated	   ova	   and	   one	   of	   the	   husbands’	   sperm	   –	  
Labassee	  v.	   France95,	  Mennesson	  v.	   France96	  	   –	   the	   Court	   held	   unanimously	   that	  the	   refusal	   of	   French	   authorities	   to	   issue	   a	   birth	   certificate	   that	   recognised	  commissioning	   parents	   as	   legal	   parents	   of	   the	   children	   violated	   the	   children’s	  rights	  to	  private	  life	  guaranteed	  by	  Article	  8.	  The	  Court	  observed	  that	  the	  right	  to	  private	   life	   means	   that	   everyone	   has	   the	   right	   to	   establish	   their	   identity,	  including	  parentage.	  The	   inability	   to	  do	   so	   raised	   a	   serious	  question	   about	   the	  compatibility	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  the	  child,	  which	  remained	  the	  Court’s	  main	  concern.	  The	  Court	  did	  not	  find	  violation	  of	  the	  right	  to	  private	  life	  of	  the	  parents.	  Nevertheless,	  in	  finding	  a	  breach	  of	  the	  children’s	  rights	  under	  Article	  8	  in	  conjunction	  with	  Article	  14,	  the	  Court	  recognised	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  violation	   on	   the	   parents’	   lives.	   Hence,	   the	   Court	   accepted	   the	   applicants’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  Labassee	  v.	  France95,	  Application	  no	  65941/11,	  Council	  of	  Europe:	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  26	  June	  2014.	  96	  Mennesson	  v.	  France,	  Application	  no	  65192/11,	  Council	  of	  Europe:	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  26	  June	  2014.	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arguments	  that	  the	  refusal	  to	  authorise	  adoption	  was	  ineffective	  in	  practice,	  as	  it	  did	   not	   deprive	   the	   children	   of	   the	   legal	   parent-­‐child	   relationship	   with	   the	  mother	   and	   father	   recognised	   under	   Californian	   law	   and	   did	   not	   prevent	   the	  applicants	   from	   living	   together	   in	   France.	   Crucially,	   the	   Court	   voiced	   criticism	  over	  the	  fact	  that	  ‘their	  effective	  and	  affective	  family	  life	  was	  “legally	  clandestine”.	  This	   was	   particularly	   shocking	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   first	   applicant,	   who	  was	   the	  biological	   father	   of	   the	   children	   and	   there	   was	   nothing	   to	   prevent	   that	  relationship	  from	  being	  officially	  recorded.’	  [emphasis	  added]	  97	  	  This	   line	   of	   jurisprudence	   reflects	   a	   growing	   concern	   with	   uncertainties	  stemming	   from	   gaps	   in	   the	   law	   accompanying	   transnational	   processes	  facilitating	   family	   formation.	  The	  Court	  seems	  determined	  to	  avoid	   legal	   fiction	  where	  it	  is	  unnecessary	  and	  align	  legal	  facts	  with	  social	  reality.	  Interestingly,	  like	  the	   English	   courts,	   the	   ECtHR	   uses	   the	   prohibition	   of	   discrimination	   to	   grant	  visibility	   to	  subjects	   leading	   ‘legally	  clandestine’	   lives.	  The	  use	  of	   this	  phrase	   is	  significant.	  First	  of	  all,	  it	  demonstrates	  that	  a	  legal	  vacuum,	  leading	  to	  invisibility	  and	  a	  life	  under	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  law,	  can	  amount	  to	  violation	  of	  human	  rights.	  Secondly,	  it	  indicates	  a	  redefinition	  of	  the	  right	  to	  respect	  private	  and	  family	  life.	  Originally,	   the	  main	  purpose	  of	  Article	  8	  was	  to	  protect	  the	  individual	   from	  the	  unjustified	  interference	  of	  the	  state.	  With	  time,	  the	  scope	  of	  protection	  widened	  to	   encompass	   negative	   and	   positive	   obligations	   of	   the	   state	   to	   protect	   the	  individual	   in	   his/her	   relationships	   with	   others	   in	   society.	   The	   main	   aim	  remained	   the	   same,	   to	   guarantee	   an	   intimate	   sphere	   of	   life	   in	   which	   the	  individual	  can	  develop	  freely.98	  More	  recently,	  the	  interpretation	  of	  Article	  8	  has	  undergone	   further	   transformations	   as	   a	   result	   of	   which	   privacy	   started	   to	  encompass	   special	   and	   informational	   autonomy	  and	   the	   right	   to	   develop	  one’s	  personality.99	  It	   could	   be	   said	   that	   one	   of	   the	   primary	   purposes	   of	   the	   right	   to	  privacy	  has	  been	  to	  guarantee	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  invisibility	  that	  will	  allow	  the	  self-­‐fulfilment	   and	   self-­‐development	   of	   the	   individual.	  However,	   the	   judgments	  discussed	  above	  seem	  to	  go	  beyond	  this	  purpose.	  By	  pronouncing	  state	  actions	  leading	   to	   legally	   clandestine	   lives	   to	   be	   in	   breach	   of	   the	   right	   to	   privacy,	   the	  Court	  has	   turned	   the	  provision	  of	  Article	  8	   ‘on	   its	  head’.100	  The	  right	   to	  private	  life	  now	  encompasses	  the	  right	  to	  remain	  visible	  to	  public	  authorities.	  Visibility	  here	   is	   clearly	   connected	   to	   the	  notions	  of	   legal	   subjectivity	  and	  citizenship.	   In	  addition,	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   decision,	   a	   positive	   obligation	   arises	   on	   public	  authorities	  to	  guarantee	  their	  citizens	  a	  degree	  of	  visibility,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  is	  necessary	   to	   pursue	   the	   development	   of	   one’s	   personality.	   It	   also	   implies	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  Mennesson	  v	  France,	  para	  67.	  98	  Botta	  v.	  Italy,	  24	  February	  1998,	  Application	  No.	  21439/93.	  See	  also:	  Burghartz	  v.	  Switzerland,	  22	  February	  1994,	  §	  24,	  Series	  A	  no.	  280	  B.	  99	  A.	  Krajewska,	  The	  right	  to	  personality	  in	  (post-­‐)genomic	  medicine	  –	  new	  way	  of	  thinking	  for	  the	  new	  frontier,	  1	  European	  Human	  Rights	  Law	  Review,	  2011,	  54-­‐70.	  100	  Although	  the	  ECtHR	  has	  often	  criticised	  restrictive	  abortion	  laws	  for	  creating	  space	  for	  unsafe	  clandestine	  abortions,	  it	  has	  never	  considered	  obscurity	  in	  itself	  a	  violation	  of	  human	  rights.	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there	   is	   a	   distinction	   between	   acceptable	   and	   unacceptable	   forms	   of	   legal	  clandestineness.	   The	   unacceptable	   ones	   seem	   to	   be	   those,	   which	   create	  uncertainty	  and	  perpetuate	  discrimination	  and	  exclusion	  in	  social	  life.	  	  This	   line	   of	   jurisprudence	   has	   been	   severely	   criticised	   for	   creating	   double	  standards	   for	   surrogacy	   at	   home	   and	   abroad.101	  It	   has	   been	   argued	   that	   the	  decisions	   ‘forced’	   national	   authorities	   to	   register	   children	   born	   through	  surrogacy	   in	   another	   state,	   based	   on	   the	   best	   interests	   of	   the	   child,	   while	  surrogacy	   remained	   unlawful	   under	   domestic	   law.	   This	   was	   perceived	   as	   a	  backdoor	  acceptance	  of	  surrogacy	  and	  as	  depriving	  states	  of	  the	  decision-­‐making	  power	  in	  this	  regard.	  However,	  this	  criticism	  supports	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  ECtHR	  jurisprudence	   has	   created	   new	   rights	   and	   new	   subjects	   of	   transnational	   law.	  More	  importantly,	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  ECtHR	  jurisprudence,	  further	  developed	  by	  national	  courts,	  demonstrates	  that	  one	  of	  the	  main	  functions	  of	  rights	  lies	  in	  their	  emancipatory	   potential.	   In	   the	   cases	   discussed	   above,	   the	   revealing	   power	   of	  fundamental	   (human)	   rights	   is	   embedded	   in	   the	   wording	   of	   the	   judgments.	  Rights	   empower	   people,	   if	   not	   judicially	   then	   at	   least	   politically.	   In	   the	   cases	  described	   above	   rights,	   acquired	   through	   human	   rights	   litigation,	   are	   likely	   to	  have	   a	   transformative	   effect	   on	   legal	   and	   social	   structures	   and	   institutions	  internationally	  and	  domestically.	  Even	  in	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  ECtHR	  has	  rejected	  the	   applicant’s	   claims102,	   the	   judgments	   have	   demonstrated	   the	   gravity	   of	   the	  problem	  of	  cross-­‐border	  surrogacy	  and	  its	  devastating	  implication	  for	  individual	  lives. 103 	  This	   visibilisation	   may	   provide	   further	   impetus	   necessary	   for	   the	  development	   of	   transnational	   norms	   either	   through	   litigation	   or	   through	  international	   bodies	   such	   as	   the	   Hague	   Conference	   Expert	   Group	   on	   the	  Surrogacy/Parental	   Project,	   which	   could	   further	   influence	   domestic	   laws	   and	  practices.	   In	   this	   respect,	   visibilisation	   through	   right-­‐based	   litigation	   is	   a	   vital	  part	  in	  the	  acquisition	  of	  legal	  subjectivity.	  At	  least	  in	  its	  later	  stage	  visibilisation	  through	   public	   law	   fits	   squarely	   with	   the	   analysis	   offered	   by	   Thornhill,	   who	  observes	  that:	  	  ‘…litigation	   configures,	   and	   it	   adds	   new	   rights	   to,	   constructions	   of	   political	  citizenship,	   and	   it	   builds	   up,	   from	   everyday	   activities	   and	   requirements,	   a	  complex	  evolving	  profile	  of	  the	  claims	  and	  expectations	  that	  can	  be	  attached	  to	  citizenship.	   In	   particular,	   litigation	   is	   able	   to	   align	   legal	   claim	   to	   international	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  K.	  Trimmings	  and	  P.	  R.	  Beaumont,	  ‘Recent	  Jurisprudence	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  in	  the	  Area	  of	  Cross-­‐Border	  Surrogacy:	  Is	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  Still	  a	  Need	  for	  Global	  Regulation	  of	  Surrogacy?’,	  in:	  G.	  Biagioni,	  and	  F.	  Ippolito	  (Eds.),	  Migrant	  Children	  in	  the	  XXI	  Century:	  Selected	  
Issues	  of	  Public	  and	  Private	  International	  Law	  (Editoriale	  Scientifica	  2016).	  	  <https://www.abdn.ac.uk/law/documents/CPIL_2016-­‐4.pdf>.	  102	  Paradiso	  and	  Campanelli	  v	  Italy	  [2017]	  ECHR	  96;	  D.	  and	  Others	  v	  Belgium (Application	  No	  29176/13),	  8	  July	  2014.	  	  103	  M.	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  on	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  and	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  v	  Italy,	  Medical	  
Law	  Review,	  published	  online	  on	  21	  February	  2018,	  	  fwy002,	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norms,	   and	   it	   is	   able	   to	   graft	   new	   rights	   onto	   given	   legal	   expectations	   on	   this	  basis.	  Moreover,	  in	  changing	  the	  rights	  profile	  of	  persons	  in	  society,	  litigation	  is	  able	  to	  generate	  new	  legal	  subjects,	  and	  to	  bring	  into	  visibility	  legal	  persons	  that	  had	  historically	  not	  been	  recognized.	  Litigation	   is	   thus	  able	  to	  create	  models	  of	  citizenship	   that	   step	   beyond	   the	   aggregate	   of	   rights	   defined	   and	   conferred	   by	  national	   bodies,	   and	   to	   trace	   out	   new	   potentials	   for	   broader	   legal-­‐political	  mobilization	  and	  recognition.’104	  	  
CONCLUSIONS	  This	   paper	   aimed	   to	   analyse	   the	   rapidly	   developing	   system	   of	   transnational	  health	   law	   in	   the	   context	   of	   broader	   debates	   about	   the	   nature	   and	  patterns	   of	  development	  of	  transnational	  law	  and	  global	  constitutionalism.	  More	  specifically,	  it	  aimed	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  two	  important	  divergent	  claims	  about	  the	  development	  of	   transnational	   law,	  made	   by	   Gunther	   Teubner	   and	   Chris	   Thornhill,	   could	   be	  reconciled	   if	   seen	   as	   two	   aspects	   of	   the	   process	   in	   which	   new	   subjects	   of	  transnational	   (health)	   law	  acquire	  visibility	   and	   legal	   subjectivity.	  The	  analysis	  revealed	   complex	   processes	   of	   law	   formation	   that	   call	   into	   question	   the	  persistent	  dichotomy	   in	   the	   theoretical	   constructions	  of	   transnational	   law.	  The	  example	   of	   single	   persons	   accessing	   ARTs	   helps	   to	   put	   forward	   the	   following	  argument.	   The	   process	   in	   which	   new	   subjects	   acquire	   visibility	   at	   the	  transnational	   level	   consists	   of	   two	   stages.	   The	   first	   stage	   includes	   a	   tacit	  development	   of	   global	   private	   orderings	   through	   self-­‐regulation	   and	   system-­‐specific	   basic	   rights.	   It	   depends	   on,	   and	   is	   influenced	   by,	   the	   exclusionary	   and	  inclusionary	   processes	   that	   take	   place	   at	   the	   domestic	   level.	   The	   case	   study	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  social	  exclusion	  of	  individuals	  in	  domestic	  setting	  has	  led	  to	  their	  marginalisation	  in	  law,	  policy	  and	  medical	  practice	  and	  their	  invisibility	  in	   an	   important	   sphere	   of	   social	   life.	   However,	   their	   lack	   of	   visibility	   did	   not	  preclude	   their	   participation	   in	   the	   ever-­‐expanding	   and	   open	   transnational	  system	  of	  cross-­‐border	  reproductive	  care	  supported	  by	  free-­‐market	  economy.	  As	  claimed	   by	   Teubner,	   the	   rapid	   expansion	   of	   the	   THL	   system	   has	   been	  accompanied	   by	   its	   tacit	   self-­‐regulation,	   i.e.	   a	   development	   of	   system-­‐specific	  principles	  and	  rights	  concerning	  individuals	  involved	  in	  transnational	  exchanges.	  This	  stage	  is	  dominated	  by	  private	  law,	  which	  ‘irritates’	  the	  international	  human	  rights	  system.	  This	  development	  resulted	  in	  an	  ‘eruption’	  and	  visibilisation	  of	  the	  problem	  before	  national	  and	  supranational	  courts.	  	  	  The	  second	  stage	   is	   the	  process	  of	  visibilisation	  through	  rights-­‐based	   litigation,	  which	   can	   lead	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   new	   transnational	   legal	   subjectivity.	   This	  stage	  can	  be	  aligned	  with	  Thornhill’s	   theory	  of	   transnational	   constitutionalism,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	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  of	  Democracy	  CUP	  2018	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in	  which	  national	  courts	   incorporate	  human	  rights	  principles	  developed	  earlier	  by	   international	   human	   rights	   courts	   to	   shed	   light	   on	   new	   legal	   subjects.	   The	  case	  study	  demonstrated	  how	  the	  jurisprudence	  of	  the	  UK	  courts	  developed	  the	  general	   principles	   developed	   by	   the	   ECtHR	   and	   triggered	   a	   legislative	   process	  that	  will	  lead	  to	  inclusion	  of	  a	  new	  group	  of	  subjects	  into	  the	  social	  space	  created	  through	   assisted	   reproduction.	   The	   ECHR	   itself	   would	   arguably	   not	   have	  developed	  its	  line	  of	  jurisprudence	  if	  it	  were	  not	  for	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  cross-­‐border	   health	   care	   and	   the	   formation	   of	   internal	   legal	   principles	   through	   self-­‐regulation.	   Consequently,	   domestic	   jurisprudence	   will	   be	   able	   to	   release	   the	  potential	  for	  further	  expansion	  of	  the	  system	  of	  reproductive	  medicine,	  not	  only	  in	   the	   UK,	   but	   also	   transnationally.	   This	   transnational	   legal	   subjectivity	   then	  transgresses	   national	   jurisdictional	   borders	   and	   influences	   the	   self-­‐constitutionalisation	  of	  private	  orderings.	  Therefore,	  recursivity	  occurs	  not	  only	  between	  international	  and	  national	  levels	  (especially	  in	  the	  context	  of	  litigation),	  but	  also	  between	  the	  public	  and	  the	  private	  sphere.	  	  	  There	   are	   two	   broader	   conclusions	   concerning	   transnational	   health	   law	  stemming	   from	   this	   analysis.	   First,	   transnational	   health	   law	   displays	   many	  features	   of	   a	   global	   private	   ordering	   or	   a	   societal	   fragment.	   Nevertheless,	   its	  development	  still	  depends	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  on	  the	  legal	  mechanisms	  of	  exclusion	  and	   inclusion	   developed	   by	   public	   state	   institutions.	   Second,	   it	   constitutes	   an	  important	  example	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  inclusionary	  processes	  are	  shaped	  by	  complex	   internal	   and	  external	  pressures	   released	   in	   the	  public	  and	   the	  private	  sphere.	   Further	   studies	   into	   the	   relationship	   between	   these	   interrelated	  processes	   are	   required.	   The	   notion	   of	   invisibility	   and	   visibilisation	   of	   new	  subjects	   constitutes	   a	   useful	   framework	   through	   which	   complex	   and	   dynamic	  processes	   of	   development	   of	   transnational	   health	   law	   can	   be	   analysed.	   As	   the	  study	  of	   legal	   subjectivity	   in	   the	   field	  of	   transnational	  health	   law	  develops,	   the	  questions	   concerning	   the	   formation	   of	   legal	   principles	   and	   structures	   in	  transnational	   health	   system	   need	   to	   be	   placed	   on	   the	   investigative	   agenda.	   A	  sociological	   approach	   to	   these	   questions	   seems	   to	   carry	   a	   great	   promise	   of	  original	  insights.	  	  	  
